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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis offers a comparison, which rarely, if ever, has been made 
between Isaiah Berlin and Charles Taylor’s account of the ideas of Johann 
Gottfried Herder on the relationship of language, culture and nationality.  It argues 
that Berlin misrepresents Herder’s ideas in emphasizing the extent to which 
differences in language and culture necessarily result in ethnic and national 
conflicts between incompatible cultural worldviews, while Taylor does correctly 
understand that Herder sees no reason for why such conflict between cultural 
entities should be inevitable either within a single state or between states.  The 
thesis concludes by offering reasons for why Herder, properly understood, allows 
us to be optimistic about the future of both intrastate and interstate relationships 
among diverse cultural groups.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to thank Professor Allan Macleod for his assistance in 
supervising the thesis, as well as in teaching Political Studies 839.3 
(Contemporary Political Philosophy).  The readings and discussions in this class 
were of great assistance.  I would also like to express my gratitude to Professor 
Buschert for his comments and help through the revision period and to Professor 
Garcea for serving on my committee on such short notice.  In all instances, I could 
not have asked for finer or more reasonable set of professors to have worked with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
 
Dedication  
 
 
To my grandparents: Paul and Nellie Harach.  Thank you for your continual love 
and support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Permission To Use …………………………………………………………..     i 
 
Abstract  ……………………………………………………………………..     ii 
 
Acknowledgments …………………………………………………………...    iii 
 
Dedication ……………………………………………………………………    iv 
 
Introduction …………………………………………………………………..    1 
 
Chapter 1 ……………………………………………………………………..    7 
Herder on Language, Culture and the Birth of Pluralism 
 
Chapter 2 ……………………………………………………………………..   18 
The Herderian Resolution to Pluralism: Historical Causation and Humanität 
 
Chapter 3 ……………………………………………………………………..   37 
Isaiah Berlin 
 
Chapter 4 ……………………………………………………………………..   51 
Charles Taylor 
 
Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………   67 
 
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………….   73 
 
 
 1
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Recent political thinking has revealed a challenge regarding the 
conventional understanding of morality and its claim involving the existence of 
universal moral truths.  While this dispute involves a number of aspects and a 
heterogeneous group of thinkers, one theme common to many of them is a 
mounting emphasis on the pluralistic nature of cultural and societal forms of 
knowledge, along with the inferred proposition that the beliefs adopted by various 
individuals, groups, and even nations existing within these contexts may differ 
sharply from one another.  What this essentially points to is the notion that 
culturally inspired forms of diversity make it difficult, if not impossible, for human 
beings to co-exist, either within a multicultural society or between ethnically 
homogenous nations.  
Co-existence is more than just avoiding clashes between people and 
civilizations which lead to conflict and war.  It also involves providing the 
conditions where all people, in all social spheres, can come to recognize cultural 
differences as a source of ideas which not only demands respect and 
acknowledgment, but also as a resource which can be used to enrich their lives and 
improve humanity.  As a result, approaches towards diversity which encourage 
difference-blind policies, permitting people to fight for their differences, without 
encouraging them to learn about others or providing them with a framework which 
could be used to address diversity, are unacceptable.  
Allowing people to remain unaware of the diversity of others, either at 
national or international levels, while still permitting them to defend their 
differences and convictions in the face of attacks, can lead to the development of 
identity politics which, in turn, fosters social and political divisions that undermine 
stability and create the conditions which can escalate into conflict.  Remaining 
unaware of the diversity of others can also disconnect people from larger sources 
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of meaning and knowledge, which are present in understanding the perspectives of 
others, which can prevent conflict and move humanity towards the establishment 
of social conditions where all cultures might  flourish.  What is needed, therefore, 
to successfully address the problems associated with pluralism is an approach 
towards cultural differences which meets all the requirements of co-existence.  
This thesis will examine the problematic dimensions of social diversity and 
provide an approach which can prevent the types of conflicts which are believed to 
be inspired by a plurality of culturally divergent values.  It will also address the 
challenges and requirements vital to the successful co-existence between diverse 
groups.  This will be accomplished by explicating and analyzing the philosophies 
of Johann Gottfried Herder, the late Isaiah Berlin, and Charles Taylor on the 
subject of pluralism.  Basic questions which will be explored include:  Does a 
plurality of values necessarily entail incommensurability and, as a result, conflict?  
Are the differences between some communities so significant that no common 
position can be found?  Or does common ground exist from which cooperation and 
conflict resolution can be initiated?  In order to address these questions, ideas 
indispensable to Herder’s philosophy on pluralism, such as his theories of 
language, culture, and nationalism, will be presented.  Understanding Herder’s 
usage of these ideas will be valuable in assessing Berlin and Taylor’s 
interpretation of Herder, as well as their usage of his ideas in addressing the 
intrastate and interstate problems associated with social diversity.   
The significance of Herder (in understanding and reconciling social 
diversity) for answering the questions of this thesis cannot be overstated since he 
is often, among his many achievements, identified as one of the first thinkers to 
stress the uniqueness and equal validity of cultures.  Herder’s philosophy is also an 
early example of the lifeworld turn in philosophy which claims that a human 
being, and the knowledge she uses throughout her life, is influenced by her 
situation in a symbolic or linguistically inspired world of social and cultural 
involvements.1  The origin and effect of lifeworlds is a focal point for Herder, who 
                                                 
1 Herder has also been hailed as the father of the related notions of nationalism, historicism, and the 
Volksgeist; credited with being one of the leaders of the romantic revolt against classicism, 
rationalism, and faith in the omnipotence of scientific method; considered by many to be one of the 
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considers the cohesion which it can create amongst people, particularly at the 
national level, to be a cause of aggressive nationalism and interstate conflict.  
Herder’s approach to pluralism, as expresssed in his theories on nationalism and 
avoiding national conflict, can also be applied to a variety of other social 
situations, such as intrastate co-existence.       
Drawing on the ideas of Herder is Berlin, a man who is often credited with 
rescuing Herder from his relative neglect by other philosophers,2 and his former 
student, Taylor.  Both Berlin and Taylor draw heavily on Herder, as well as on one 
another, in developing their unique positions regarding the possibility of 
reconciling social diversity.  They are also largely recognized as being the first 
philosophers (with perhaps the unfair exclusion of Fredrick M. Barnard3) who 
have attempted to bring Herder’s philosophical importance to the attention of 
Anglophone philosophy.4  Currently no academic work exists which assesses the 
accuracy of Berlin’s and Taylor’s interpretations of Herder and the relevance of 
these interpretations to their own philosophies on pluralism.   
This thesis begins by explicating the elements within Herder’s philosophy 
which are essential to his understanding of, and approach to pluralism.  This is 
established in the first two chapters by focusing on ideas such as language, culture, 
and nationality.  The subsequent chapters on Berlin and Taylor outline each of 
their interpretations of Herder and assess their accuracy from the standpoint of 
Herder’s own writings.  The effect which these interpretations have had on their 
                                                                                                                                      
most formidable adversaries of the French philosophes and their German disciples; and an 
important initiator in the Sturm und Drang movement.  Isaiah Berlin, “Herder and the 
Enlightenment,” The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry Hardy (London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 
359. 
2 Charles Taylor, “The Importance of Herder,” Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1995), 79. 
3 While Berlin and Taylor are largely credited with popularizing Herder’s philosophy within 
Anglophone philosophy, Barnard has the most substantial collection of published writings on 
Herder.  Despite this Barnard’s importance is often considered secondary to that of Berlin and 
Taylor.  Barnard’s publications include Herder’s Social and Political Thought: From 
Enlightenment to Nationalism (London, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965); J.G. Herder on 
Social and Political Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969); Self-Direction and 
Political Legitimacy: Rousseau and Herder (London, UK: Clarendon Press, 1988); and Herder on 
Nationality, Humanity, and History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2003). 
4 Michael N. Forster, “Introduction,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xxxv. 
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own writings on pluralism is also explained and assessed.  The final chapter 
concludes the thesis by commenting on key elements within the philosophies of 
Herder, Berlin, and Taylor which are useful in addressing pluralism. 
The first chapter explains Herder’s theory of language, as well as its 
relation to culture and the creation of pluralism.  Herder’s theory of language is 
marked by several insights considered to be of epochal importance since they 
depart sharply from many of the theories prevalent throughout his lifetime and 
anticipate many positions which have been pursued and clarified by subsequent 
thinkers.  The most innovative of these insights includes the notion that expression 
constitutes the linguistic dimension; that language can only exist within a context 
of language practices, such as the Volk (the cultural community) which carries it; 
and that language not only allows human beings to have a greater awareness of 
things but also transformed feelings, thereby revealing new ways of responding to 
a variety of situations.  According to Herder, this greater awareness allows for the 
creation of new ideas and goals, some of which could come to differ from one 
another.  Pluralism, consequently, is both revealed and created by the awareness 
associated with language. 
Herder’s approach to pluralism is explained in the second chapter.  This 
chapter explicates his approach by explaining its most integral elements, his theory 
of historical causation and Humanität (increased humanity).  According to Herder, 
historical causation is determined by the choices made by individuals and Völker 
(cultural communities).  These choices, as well as the interactions or social 
encounters which assist in bringing them out, are also guided by a transcendental 
force, what Herder labels Kraft.  According to Herder, Kraft assists in guiding all 
social interactions, and thus the direction of history, towards states of increased 
Humanität. 
In order to assist humanity’s development towards Humanität, Herder 
proposes creating an environment in which the discussion of ideas is one of the 
primary social and political activities.  He also recommends an education process 
which creates an openness towards new ideas, as well as an awareness of other 
cultures.  Other aspects of Herder’s approach towards pluralism include the 
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following notions: first, the need to establish a sense of social and historical 
embeddedness which can act as a source of cohesion between diverse groups; 
second, to ensure that this embeddedness also provides the optimal level of 
creativity possible within the various social and institutional contexts within which 
it is implemented, while also allowing for a communicative response (inspired by 
grass roots participation) to emerging problems; and third, the realization that 
appreciating social diversity calls for different methods of enquiry, such as 
methods that demand a cognitive sensitivity towards the uniquely individual and 
the culturally diverse.   
The third chapter focuses on Berlin’s interpretation of Herder, as well as 
his own views on pluralism.  In both instances, the theme Berlin identifies as being 
of utmost importance is that a plurality of values, combined with a person’s free 
will and desire to achieve her own “ends,” makes the reconciliation between social 
values impossible.  Berlin’s supreme confidence in this claim influences both his 
reading of Herder, as well his approach to pluralism.  As a result, Berlin ignores 
several key elements from the Herderian cosmology, such as the notion of 
Humanität and the importance of education, in favor of his own approach, which 
is opposed to any action associated with the betterment of humanity since such 
action often corresponds to a relaxing of the rules which provide people with a 
minimum amount of space free from coercion.  For Berlin, sacrificing the latter for 
the former is a slippery slope which frequently leads towards tyranny.   
Herder’s value for Taylor and the influence which he has had on Taylor’s 
philosophy of pluralism is explained in the fourth chapter.  For Taylor, this 
involves the realization that Herder’s linguistic innovations have assisted in 
bringing forth a different conception of human agency, what Taylor refers to as the 
dialogical self.  The dialogical self involves the realization that a human being’s 
understanding or knowledge of the world, which is brought forth through 
language, is dependent on a context of others.  Without a context of others a 
human being could never have learned the languages which she uses to understand 
the world and without her continual interactions with others she cannot expect to 
advance these understandings.   
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The notion of the dialogical self is useful for Taylor since he believes it 
creates a more situated understanding of human agency which prevents social 
diversity from ending up in conflict and acts against the causes of conflict: such as 
identity misrecognition and social fragmentation.  Taylor also believes that many 
of the insights which Herder uses to approach diversity, which he takes and applies 
to the intrastate context of a multicultural society, are indispensable in effectively 
approaching pluralism.  These insights rely largely on the importance of language 
and communication as a way of developing common moral positions. 
The conclusion sums up the ideas used by Herder and expanded on by 
Taylor which are useful in approaching pluralism and creating the conditions by 
which diverse groups of people, both at the intrastate and interstate levels, can co-
exist.  For both of them, this involves the realization that the establishment of 
common moral positions can best be achieved, or worked towards, in a dialogical 
society where a dialogue process between all members of society takes primacy.  
For Herder and Taylor, a dialogical society allows for a communicative process to 
guide diverse groups, either to the development of common moral positions, or, at 
the very least, to an acceptance of a “best account” between their diverse 
perspectives.  These “best accounts” are continually negotiated and recreated 
through a discussion process which strives to include the entire community.  The 
innovations made in establishing common positions between diverse groups and 
nations can be used as a model, to be emulated by others, which can direct 
humanity towards greater conditions of social coexistence. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Herder on Language, Culture and the Birth of Pluralism 
 
 
As a thinker, Herder is situated in a unique spot in the course of Western 
history between the Enlightenment and the Romantic Rebellion against it.  As a 
result, living in the 18th century provided Herder with the opportunity to address 
the prevailing attitudes of his time, many of which found their origins in 17th 
century thought, and to determine the direction his philosophy would take relative 
to these ideas.  For Herder, this involved confrontation with two ideas: 
instrumental rationality and a theory of language whose basic features can be 
found in the philosophy of John Locke.  Herder’s rejection of these philosophical 
ideas shaped the direction of his life’s work. 
The form of instrumental rationality which Herder reacted against is 
generally recognized as rooted in the thought of René Descartes, considered by 
many to be the originator of modern philosophy.  Descartes popularized a concept 
of reason based on a subject-object dichotomy in which a human subject is 
understood to be completely independent of all objects that she encounters.  This 
emphasis on the subject-object dichotomy means that everything and everybody 
outside of the thinking subject, which is understood to be a detached individual, is 
viewed as an object external to it and from which it is disengaged.  In other words, 
others and the world in which they live are viewed as things, objects or 
instruments to be used in the fulfillment of the subject’s will or purposes.  For such 
a detached and isolated subject reason is understood only instrumentally; that is, it 
is seen as a way of thinking which can most effectively realize the goals of the 
individual subject.  Whether the goals themselves are rational tends to be of 
secondary concern.   
The dualism associated with instrumental rationality thus encourages a way 
of reasoning by which human agents can analyze, categorize, and understand all 
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objects for the purpose of controlling and manipulating them according to their 
own interests.  This approach achieved a burgeoning amount of success in the field 
of the natural sciences where variables could be isolated and controlled in order to 
conduct scientific experiments.  The success of instrumental rationality in the 
sciences also resulted in it being applied to non-scientific fields such as the social 
sciences and humanities. 
Instrumental rationality’s one-sided emphasis on the subject-object 
paradigm, particularly when it is used to study non-scientific fields, produces a 
praxis which compartmentalizes, objectifies, and functionalizes human beings and 
nature. These tendencies can take primacy not only as a method of thinking or 
“reasoning,” but also in the social areas which they are studying, such as those 
which involve the interactions of human beings.1  One of the effects of this 
development is that it displaces other theories or conceptions of existence and 
creates a conception of human agency and the entire natural universe which is 
mechanical.  That is, the entire world is seen to be a machine whose parts can be 
manipulated for the purpose of human gain.  Taylor elaborates:     
 
Once society no longer has a sacred structure, once social arrangements 
and modes of action are no longer grounded in the order of things or the 
will of God, they are in a sense up for grabs.  They can be redesigned with 
their consequences for the happiness and well being of individuals as our 
goal.  The yardstick that henceforth applies is that of instrumental reason.  
Similarly, once the creatures that surround us lose the significance that 
accrued to their place in the chain of being, they are open to being treated 
as raw material or instruments for our projects.2 
 
While acknowledging the improvements instrumental rationality allowed 
for when applied to scientific matters, particularly by advancing an understanding 
of the world and the capabilities of technology, Herder firmly opposed its usage in 
                                                 
1 This is a major point for Taylor who devotes a significant amount of attention to understanding 
the effects which instrumental rationality has had on human agency.  See Charles Taylor, 
“Atomism,” Philosophical Papers II: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 187-211; and Charles Taylor, “Lichtung or Lebensform: Parallels between 
Heidegger and Wittgenstein,” Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 61-79.      
2 Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1991), 5. 
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social or interpretative issues.  As far as he was concerned, its tendency to 
objectify reduced human behavior and the entire natural universe to a set of 
common mathematical laws stripped of passion and spontaneity.3  More 
significantly, however, he felt that internalizing instrumental reason as a way of 
understanding human beings disconnected people from the sources of meaning and 
knowledge present in others, thus creating a flattened conception of human 
existence.  A final consequence of these opinions is that any philosophy which 
used an instrumental approach became inconsistent with human nature and 
detrimental to the development of humanitarian social conditions.  Herder (using 
Descartes as a historical reference point) explains:  “[s]ince Descartes made 
thinking into his entire doubting I [the signature referent of his dualism and 
instrumentalism], what systems have arisen, each more unnatural than the next.”4  
Human beings, Herder believed, are not “lifeless cogs of a great, wooden, 
thoughtless machine.”5  They are creatures whose continual development depends 
on their interaction and exposure to several larger social, cultural, and historical 
environments.  Herder’s aversion to the tendencies of instrumentalism corresponds 
with his central political idea: specifically, that a political community should not 
be based on an instrumental tendency which separates human beings from one 
another, but must presume the cooperation of all citizens within a pluralistic power 
scheme where power and control are not centralized but widely diffused.6  The 
core of Herder’s political ideas, as with the rest of his philosophy, stems largely 
from his theory of language.  
Not only does Herder’s theory of language influence the entire 
development of his philosophical system, but, according to Taylor, it also helps to 
combat the effects of cultural disengagement and myopic universalism promoted 
by social theories that use an instrumental approach.  While the move towards a 
                                                 
3 Daniel Chirot, “Herder’s Multicultural Theory of Nationalism and Its Consequences,” Eastern 
European Politics and Societies, vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter 1996), 6. 
4 Johann Gottfried Herder, “On Cognition and Sensation, the Two Main Forces of the Human 
Soul,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 181. 
5 Ibid., 301. 
6 F.M Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought: From Enlightenment to Nationalism 
(London, UK: Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965), xix. 
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more situated understanding of thinking (such as being embedded in a “world” of 
involvements) is evident enough in the work of several later thinkers such as 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger,7 Herder happens to be one of its pioneers.8  Taylor 
explains, “[m]y (perhaps overdramatic) claim is that Herder is the hinge figure 
who originated a fundamentally different way of thinking about language and 
meaning.”9  While it may be true that Herder did not always draw out the 
conclusions implicit in the new perspectives which he adopted, his innovations 
have nonetheless played a significant role in the counter-thrust against 
instrumentalism.10           
An important aspect of Herder’s theory of language is the departure which 
it takes from existing theories of language which conceived language to be 
reflective of a prelinguistic mental or physical experience.  According to this 
theory, certain “ideas,” or “bits” of information precede the formation of language. 
These “ideas” or “bits” of information are eventually experienced by people who 
designate them with certain arbitrary symbols which become the early stages of 
language.  One of Herder’s primary objections to this theory is that its emphasis on 
designation of prelinguistic phenomena overlooks the type of awareness which is 
                                                 
7 Both Wittgenstein and Heidegger challenged the episteme associated with instrumental rationality 
by trying to recover an understanding of human agency as engaged, embedded in a culture, a form 
of life, and a “world” of involvements.  This was accomplished by both of them through their 
revealing of the dialogical facets of human agency.  For example, Wittgenstein indicated how a 
word like pain gets its meaning from the transaction between people rather than a contemplative 
experience and Heidegger indicated how human understanding was dependent on das Man (the 
crowd).   
8 Charles Taylor, “The Importance of Herder,” Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997) 91. 
9 Ibid., 79. 
10 According to Hans Aarsleff, Etienne Condillac is an earlier proponent of many of the innovations 
with which Herder is often credited.  The cause of Condillac’s historical neglect Aarsleff attributes 
to the fact that Condillac’s essay on language, “Essay on the Origin of Language (1741),” has been 
almost universally misinterpreted both in regard to its doctrines and its originality.  Aarsleff also 
suggests that Condillac’s essay has largely been forgotten since the debate which existed around 
Herder’s theory of language resulted in it being ignored and caused Herder’s theory to be read with 
very little knowledge—or none at all—of its true historical context.  See Hans Aarsleff, “The 
Tradition of Condillac: The Problem of the Origin of Language in the Eighteenth Century and the 
Debate in the Berlin Academy before Herder,” From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of 
Language and Intellectual History (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 146-210; 
and, or, compare Etienne Bonnot De Condillac, Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, ed., 
trans. Hans Aarsleff (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) with Johann Gottfried Herder, 
“Treatise on the Origin of Language,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. 
Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65-167. 
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required to use language.  While sensory information or experiences are received 
by a human being and turned into signs, the mental state which she requires to 
comprehend and use these signs is left unclear.  
As an attribute specific to human beings, language is seen by Herder as the 
central expression of a uniquely human trait, a reflective consciousness which he 
labels Besonnenheit.11  In developing language, a human being gives shape to her 
inner conscious nature, formulating her ideas and preconceptions through 
reflection on her experiences of the external world.12  Reflection, as a result, is the 
central condition necessary for a person to become a language user.  It transforms 
her psychic life by allowing her to reflect on the signs used for language.  Yet, at 
the same time, reflection can not take place without the sign or the most basic 
word which is dependent on sensation.  Herder explains: “‘a human being’s first 
condition of taking-awareness was not able to become actual without the word of 
the soul,’” and hence “‘… all conditions of awareness in him become linguistic; 
his chain of thoughts becomes a chain of words.’”13  Herder elaborates: 
 
Let us take the whole thread of man’s thoughts: since this thread is woven 
from awareness (Besonnenheit), since there is no condition in it which, 
taken as a whole, is not itself a taking of awareness (Besinnung)14 or at 
least capable of being illuminated in a taking of awareness, since in it the 
sense of feeling does not rule but the whole center of its nature falls on 
finer senses, vision and hearing, and these constantly give it language, it 
follows that, taken as a whole, “there is also no condition in the human 
soul which does not turn out to be susceptible of words or actually 
determined by words of the soul.”15  
 
                                                 
11 To translate Herder’s concept of Besonnenheit in terms of “reflection” can sometimes be 
misleading.  A more accurate understanding of the term Besonnenheit would be the entire economy 
of man’s perceptive, cognitive, and volitional nature, as it is the essential condition of the working 
of the mind, in its totality, and not only thinking.  Reflective consciousness is more than just 
another faculty.  Fredrick Barnard, “Humanity and History:  Causation and Continuity,” Herder on 
Nationality, Humanity, and History (Montreal and Kingston:  McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2003), 115.   
12 Brian J. Whitton, “Herder’s Critique of the Enlightenment:  Cultural Community versus 
Cosmopolitan Rationalism,” History and Theory, xxvii, no.2 (July 1988), 151. 
13 Herder, “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” 131. 
14 Herder understood Besinnung to be the active operation of a discerning judgment that 
presupposed reflection. Barnard, Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History, 115.  
15 Herder, “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” 132. 
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While sensations (the words of the soul) are the starting point from which 
language acquisition takes place, they are by no means, for Herder, the sole 
method through which human understanding is advanced.  For Herder, the process 
of language and concept acquisition transforms the nature of a human being’s 
sensations.  Consequently, Forster explains: “Herder’s position is not that a person 
simply has the sensations which ground concepts first and then on that basis 
acquires the concepts afterward; but rather, the sensations which ground concepts 
inevitably undergo a transformation as the concepts are acquired, their final 
required nature being one which a human being can only have along with 
concepts.”16  Forster continues, Herder believes that human beings “were able to, 
and do, achieve concepts that are in a way non-empirical, namely by means of a 
sort of metaphorical extension from the empirical ones.”17 
According to Taylor, Herder’s theory of language is marked by several 
important insights which signify the beginning of a shift in understanding within 
Western thought.  The term which Taylor coins for this Herderian inspired turn, 
“expressivism,” adequately describes the nature of the first and earliest of Herder’s 
insights: that expression constitutes the linguistic dimension.18  Supporting this 
claim, Forster notes that as early as his Fragments on Recent German Literature 
(1767-8),19  Herder had already begun arguing “that the original and fundamental 
roots of human language are expressive in nature rather than designative or 
descriptive, namely that the expressive ‘language of sensation’ which humans 
share with animals is incompatible with equating meanings with referents.”20  
Reaffirming this claim, Herder explains: “[i]n education we learn thoughts through 
words, and the nurses who form our tongues are therefore our first teachers of 
                                                 
16 Michael Forster, “Herder’s Philosophy of Language,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. LVI, no. 
221 (September 2002), 352. 
17 Ibid., 352-353. 
18 In the spirit of historical accuracy it should be mentioned that Jean-Jacques Rousseau is an 
earlier innovator of the belief that the origins of human language are expressive in nature.  
Rousseau’s essay on language, “On the Origin of Language” was written 22 years before Herder’s 
primary essay on language, “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” which was published in 1772. 
19 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Fragments on Recent German Literature,” Herder: Philosophical 
Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 33-65. 
20 Forster, “Herder’s Philosophy of Language,” 349. 
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Logic. … [I]n the whole language of common life the thought sticks to the 
expression.”21 
For Herder, words and rational concepts are coeval; the flow of language is 
ineluctably the flow of consciousness.22  Human beings do not think in thoughts 
and ideas and then look for words in which to “clothe them,” but in using language 
express the very ideas on which they are reflecting.  The telos of language is the 
proper mode of expression in a human life by which people express facts and 
meaning through their expressions.  Every mode of being is then a manifestation 
of meaning, with language being the articulation of modes of experiencing the 
universe; if no articulation, then no experience.23  Alexander Gilles explains:   
 
Fundamental to all his [Herder’s] efforts is the observation of humanity 
through its self-expression in language and literature.  Language is in his 
eyes “a dictionary of the soul,” a mirror of culture.  It derived from man’s 
special place in the cosmos and reflected his relationship to it.  As a vehicle 
of thought language transmitted all knowledge and experience.  Speech and 
intellect developed hand in hand.  Language is both the offspring and the 
guide to thought.  Man is, therefore, not only the creator of language but its 
creature as well.  He reveals himself in it, and it determines his self-
revelation.  It expresses all the workings of his soul, and his soul is an 
indivisible unity of manifold powers and impulses.  Language, thus, is the 
key to the whole understanding of man and his position within the 
universe.24  
  
The acknowledgment that a word only has meaning within a lexicon and 
the context of language practices, which are ultimately embedded in a form of life, 
is the second insight Taylor attributes to Herder’s theory of language.25  According 
to Taylor, this holism of meaning is not only one of the most important and 
universally recognized consequences of Herder’s philosophy, but it also bears a 
remarkable similarity to the type of thesis for which in our day Wittgenstein is 
                                                 
21 Herder, “Fragments on Recent German Literature,” 48. 
22 Thomas H. Jackson, “Herder, Pound, and the Concept of Expression,” Modern Language 
Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 4 (December 1983), 385. 
23 Ibid., 386. 
24 Alexander Gilles, Herder (London, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1945), 37. 
25 Taylor, “The Importance of Herder,” 93. 
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frequently celebrated.26  The most basic intuition of this thesis involves the notion 
that individual words can only have meaning within the context of an already 
articulated language.27  A word only makes sense in what Wilhelm von Humboldt 
(who followed and developed Herder’s thoughts on language) called “the web of 
language.”28 
Together, a reflective stance of understanding and the holism of meaning 
create three additional transformations which Taylor derives from Herder’s theory 
of language.  These include the inexhaustibility of language, a new dimension of 
understanding, and the dependence of language on the speech community, or the 
Volk (cultural community) which carries it.29  Focusing on the first, language is 
seen to be always more than what human beings can encompass.  Taylor explains: 
“[b]ecause the words we use can only have sense through their place in the whole 
web, we can never, in principle, have a clear oversight of the implications of what 
we are saying at any moment.  Our language is always more than we can 
encompass; it is in a sense inexhaustible.”30  Taylor elaborates:   
 
[l]anguage as a pattern of activity which human beings use to 
express/realize a certain way of being in the world, that which defines the 
linguistic dimension … can be deployed only against a background which 
we can never fully dominate.  It is also a background we are never fully 
dominated by, since we are constantly reshaping it.  Reshaping it without 
dominating it, or being able to oversee it, means that we never fully know 
what we are doing to it.  In relation to language, we are both makers and 
made.31 
 
                                                 
26 Perhaps the most powerful application of this idea can be found in the later work of Wittgenstein 
with his refutation of Augustine’s designative theory of meaning.  Wittgenstein’s refutation 
constantly refers to the background understanding human beings need to draw on to speak and 
understand.  For instance, words only have meaning within the “language” games human beings 
play, which in turn can only find their context within a whole form of life.  
27 Ibid., 94. 
28 Taylor, “Language and Human Nature,” 231.   
29 Herder broadly identified the Volk with the people who by virtue of their own industry have a 
certain sense of independence in the knowledge of standing squarely in a world of their own, in and 
through which they earn their livelihood.  F.M Barnard, “The Hebraic Roots of Herder’s 
Nationalism,” Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History (Montreal and Kingston:  McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2003), 30. 
30 Taylor, “Language and Human Nature,” 231. 
31 Taylor, “The Importance of Herder,” 97. 
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The positions present within Herder’s account of language also help to tilt 
the axis of human understanding.  If language serves to express a new kind of 
awareness, then it may not only make possible a new awareness of things, an 
ability to describe them; it may also open new ways of responding to things, of 
feeling.  If in expressing thoughts about things a human being can come to have 
new thoughts, then it also follows that in expressing her feelings she can come to 
have transformed feelings.32  Hence, the revolutionary idea of expressivism 
involves the notion that the development of new modes of expression enables 
human beings to have new feelings, more powerful or more refined, and certainly 
more self-aware.33 
The final transformation involved in Herder’s theory of language is that 
language is the most natural and hence the most indispensable basis of a 
sociopolitical association—language creates a Volk.34  The meanings which key 
words first have for one person are the same meanings they have for her larger 
community, that is, for her and her conversation partners together.  Herder 
explains: “each nation speaks in accordance with its thoughts and thinks in 
accordance with its speech.”35  While language is the tool responsible for human 
understanding, its fashioning and growth depends principally on dialogue or, 
better, on the life of the speech community.     
For Herder, it is clear that a human being cannot be a self on her own but 
only in relation to several interlocutors, in one way to those who become crucial in 
her continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding and in another way where 
her deliberations with conversation partners become essential to her own actions 
involving self-determination.  A human being can only exist within several “webs 
of interlocution” which are brought forth through her continual interactions with 
other human beings.  Elaborating on interrelatedness within all of human 
existence, Taylor explains its application within Herder’s conception of humanity: 
 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 97. 
33 Taylor, “Language and Human Nature,” 233-234. 
34 Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought, 30. 
35 Herder, “Fragments on Recent German Literature,” 50. 
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It is the idea of humanity as something realized, not in each individual 
human being but rather in communion between all humans.  The essence of 
humanity is not something that even in principle a single person could 
recognize in his or her life and this is because of the finitude and limitation 
of this life. …  The fullness of humanity comes not from the adding of 
differences but from the exchange and communion between them.  Human 
beings achieve fullness not separately but together.  The image Herder used 
was of a chorus or, we might call, an orchestra.  The ultimate richness 
comes when all the different voices or instruments come together.  It is 
something they create in the space between them.36  
 
According to Herder, all of culture, including art, poetry, and philosophy, 
are an expression of the group life.37  Together these conditions come together to 
form the whole from which a Volk then derives its sensible form of happiness.  
The sharing of a Volk is one of the most common bonds between all human beings, 
it is the means though which their worldview and happiness is created.  Herder, in 
what is perhaps his most famously quoted maxim, comments on this connection: 
“[e]ach nation has its center of happiness in itself, like every sphere has its center 
of gravity!”38   
For Herder, someone who lives her life entirely within the closed horizons 
of a culture will experience her norms, practices, and beliefs to be true-in-
themselves (thus making it possible for her to experience a sensible happiness).  
Yet when viewed from the external perspective occupied by another Volk or 
Herder himself, Damon Linker explains, “a given culture’s norms, practices, and 
beliefs can appear to be merely relatively true or true-only-for-them; they are an 
expression of its overall form-of-life at a particular age of its development in 
history and not a reflection of the world as it is in itself.”39  Herder, mindful of the 
apparent relativism which this realization implies, especially in the realm of social 
values, observes that “moral value is a phantom that appears to each person in 
                                                 
36 Charles Taylor, “A Tension in Modern Democracy,” Democracy and Vision:  Sheldon Wolin and 
the Vicissitudes of the Political, ed. Aryeh Botwinick and William E. Connolly (New Jersey, 
Princeton: University Press, 2001), 90.  
37 Robert Reinhold Ergang,  Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1931), 251. 
38 Herder, “This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of History,” 297.    
39 Damon Linker, “The Reluctant Pluralism of J.G. Herder,” The Review of Politics, vol. 62, no. 2 
(Spring 2002), 275. 
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another way, in another shape: a true Proteus [shape shifter] who by means of a 
magic mirror ever changes, and never shows himself as the same.”40  
A noticeable outcome of Herder’s theory of language is the creation of a 
plurality of values which each Volk can use to determine and direct the course of 
its life.  While language is the medium through which a human being becomes 
conscious of her inner self, it is also, it appears, the key to understanding her 
external relationships.  It unites her with, but also differentiates her from, others.  
Herder, well aware of this type of pluralism, comments on its problematic nature: 
“(t)he diversity of language, ethics, inclinations, and ways of life was destined to 
become a bar against the presumptive linking together of the peoples.”41  
Elsewhere, he elaborates:   
 
The same linking for a family which, turned inward on itself, gave strength 
to the harmony of a single tribe, turned outward from itself, against another 
race, produces strength of dissension, familial hatred!  In the former case it 
drew many all the more firmly together into a single whole; in the latter 
case it makes two parties immediately into enemies. … Hence the slogan 
soon became natural:  Whoever is not with and of us is beneath us!  The 
foreigner is worse than us, is a barbarian.  In this sense ‘barbarian’ was the 
watchword of contempt: a foreigner and simultaneously a more ignoble 
person who is not our equal in wisdom or bravery, or whatever the age’s 
point of honor might be. … And there the second synonym was ready:  
Whoever is not with me is against me. 42 
 
While recognizing the connection between the awareness associated with 
language, social diversity and conflict, Herder did not consider this to be a factor 
that justified hopelessness.  The obvious conflict involved with a plurality of 
values is just an effect, capable of being overcome, which is associated with living 
in the linguistic dimension.  This issue will be addressed in greater detail in the 
next chapter by describing Herder’s approach to pluralism and clarifying the ideas 
integral to it: his theory of historical causation and Humanität. 
 
                                                 
40 Johann Gottfried Herder, “On the Change of Taste,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. 
Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 247. 
41 Herder, “Letters for the Advancement of Humanity,” 385. 
42 Herder, “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” 152. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Herderian Resolution to Pluralism:  
Historical Causation and Humanität 
 
 
Herder’s ideas on history and causation are inseparably joined with his 
doctrine of Humanität.1  Far from being a fixed norm Humanität, in Herder’s 
hands, Barnard explains, is “a principle of dynamic change, a kind of protean 
manifestation of humanity’s striving throughout the ages.  At any given time or 
place Humanität would reflect the particular mode in which a person aspired to 
achieve that attitude in social life which befitted their nature as a human being.”2  
It is not a readily identifiable concept or social state, but rather the greatest amount 
of humanity attainable, either by an individual or a Volk, at any particular moment 
in history.  Yet in order to properly understand Humanität and the forces which 
cause it to be operative throughout history requires a specific type of 
understanding, the very type which is vital to addressing the conflicts associated 
with pluralism and which Herder elucidated within his theory of historical 
causation. 
Herder’s most ambitious work, Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of 
the Mankind,3 appeared in four parts, in 1784, 1785, 1787 and 1791.  A fifth part, 
intended to connect the historical narrative of the Renaissance to the 18th Century 
                                                 
1 Herder’s notion of Humanität is a notoriously vague term, connoting harmonious development of 
all human beings towards universally valid goals: reason, freedom, toleration, mutual love and 
respect between individuals and societies, as well as physical and spiritual health, finer perceptions, 
dominion over the earth and the harmonious realization of all that God has implanted in his noblest 
work and made in his own image.  Isaiah Berlin, “Herder and the Enlightenment,” The Proper 
Study of Mankind, ed. Henry Hardy (London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 411-412. 
2 F.M Barnard, “Herder’s Treatment of Causation and Continuity in History,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas, vol. xxiv, no. 2 (April – June 1963), 197. 
3 See Johann Gottfried Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, trans. T. Churchill 
(London: Luke Hansard, Great Turnstile, Lincoln’s-Inn Fields, 1800).  A facsimile of the Churchill 
edition was printed by Bergman Publishers; see Johann Gottfried Herder, Outlines of a Philosophy 
of the History of Man, trans. T. Churchill (New York: Bergman Publishers, 1967). 
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was, like most of Herder’s longer projects, never completed.4  This work was 
translated into English for the first and last time in 1800.  With the exception of a 
limited facsimile in 1966 of the first English edition, it has not been republished in 
its entirety; in fact, the only edition which is widely accessible, Reflections on the 
Philosophy of the History of Mankind, 5 has been one which reproduces only nine 
out of Herder’s original twenty parts of the book.6  As a result, anyone who could 
not read the German text had to depend on quotations and references found in the 
works of those who could, making for a very incomplete and distorted picture of 
Herder and his political thought.7  
A shorter sample of Herder’s writings on history, as well as some of his 
other main political themes, can be found in his earlier polemically entitled essay 
This Too a Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity (1774).8  Herder himself 
called this work a “pamphlet,” but at the same time declared with pride that it 
contained his philosophy of history.9  One of Herder’s fundamental achievements 
within this work lies in his development of the thesis that, as Forster explains, 
“even within a single culture and period, human minds are deeply individual and 
deeply different from each other, so that there are radical mental differences 
between historical periods and that people’s concepts, beliefs, and other 
propositional attitudes, perceptual and affective sensations, etc., differ in major 
ways from one period to another.”10   
                                                 
4 Robert T. Clark, Herder: His Life and Thought (Los Angeles:  University of California Press, 
1955), 308. 
5 See Johann Gottfried Herder, Reflections on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1968). 
6 Ioannis D. Evrigenis and Daniel Pellerin “Introduction,” Johann Gottfried Herder: Another 
Philosophy of History and Selected Political Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
2004), xxiii.   
7 As Evrigenis and Pellerin point out, this surprisingly is even the case of Isaiah Berlin, who, in his 
famous essay, “Herder and the Enlightenment,” refers to the Herder’s original text while also 
quoting from Barnard’s translation (Barnard, 1969).  These references were later eliminated from 
subsequent editions of the essay.  Ibid, xxiii. 
8 See Johann Gottfried Herder, “This Too a Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity,” Herder: 
Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 272-358. 
9 Evrigenis and Pellerin, xxiv. 
10 Michael Forster, “Introduction,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xxv. 
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Despite proclaiming the diversity of all peoples, Herder also insists on the 
contrary position: claiming that a relationship of relatedness still exists between all 
people, throughout all historical periods.  As a result, a large portion of Philosophy 
for the Formation of Humanity is devoted to addressing the problem of how 
human beings can remain different while also relating to one another.  This is done 
in part through Herder’s theory of historical causation.  The key feature of this 
theory involves the conviction that the teleological determinants of history are 
twofold: first, history is determined by the particular ends aimed at by individuals 
and entire Völker, implying that human choices and actions are important 
determinants within historical causation; and, second, that history is guided by an 
internal cause which he labels Kraft (a type of quasi-transcendent energy which is 
a manifestation of God), suggesting that the unfolding of history follows a divine 
plan.11  These ideas will be referred to as the particular and universal elements of 
historical causation.12 
As might be expected, both of Herder’s historical causes have resulted in a 
somewhat muddled picture of Herder’s notion of historical progress since they 
seem to be at odds with one another (it seems history can appear to be either 
divinely determined or the product of human choice but not both).  Yet, despite 
their apparent inconsistency, one of Herder’s many goals within Philosophy for the 
Formation of Humanity involved synthesizing these two elements.13  Herder’s 
synthesis involved developing a theory of metaphysics, a doctrine of vitalist 
pantheism, which later became influential in the thought of such Romantic 
                                                 
11  What might appear to a problem involving how human choices can remain the product of free 
will while also simultaneously being the working out of a divine plan is never worked out by 
Herder since, apparently, he sees no flaw in combining the two facets of causation.  Therefore, 
what Herder’s theory of causation seems to offer is a type of “coexistence” or synergism between 
historical causes.    
12 Both of these historical causes appear to satisfy what might be considered existential 
requirements, fundamental to the healthy operation of all human beings:  that a human being’s life 
has some type of transcendental meaning or purpose which extends beyond the duration of her life 
and that the choices which she makes still matter, thus possessing the power to direct her life. 
13 Herder’s synthesis has created a slew of problems relating to Philosophy for the Formation of 
Humanity’s intended purpose.  For example, Herder’s apparent oscillation between the universal 
and particular explanations of historical causation have caused many scholars to incorrectly assume 
that Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity is the presentation of two philosophies of history, 
one of which is favored by Herder, rather than the synthesis which it in fact was. 
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thinkers as Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Friedrich Schelling and Georg Wilhelm 
Hegel.14    
Fully understanding the synthesis in Herder’s historical thesis has been 
complicated by the fact that he, as part of the dialogical approach which he 
employed within Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity,15 continually situated 
one theoretical position (such as the particular and universal elements in historical 
causation) against the other.  Taking over an argumentative technique from his 
former teacher, the precritical Immanuel Kant, Herder felt that the best way for a 
philosopher to pursue the truth is by setting contrary views on a subject into 
opposition with one another and advancing towards the truth through their mutual 
testing and modification.16  Herder also applied this idea on the socio-historical 
plane believing, as Forster explains, that “the way for humankind as a whole to 
attain the elusive goal of truth is through an ongoing contest between opposing 
positions, in the course of which the best ones will eventually win out.”17 
Though eschewing any belief in a completely linear sense of historical 
progress, Herder nonetheless viewed the passing of time as possessing elements 
which indicated that it was part of a purposive historical development.  At its most 
basic level, Herder suggested that the passage of time was conducive to a type of 
“pressure of ideas” which have (or acquire) throughout the course of history a life 
of their own, carrying with them a distinctly teleological thrust which is able to 
                                                 
14 For further reading on Herder’s pantheism and its relation to Goethe, Schelling and Hegel see 
Frederick H. Burkhardt, “Introduction,” God, Some Conversations: Johann Gottfried Herder, trans. 
Frederick H. Burkhardt (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1940), 3-64. 
15 This technique was also used by Herder in the essay How Philosophy Can Become More 
Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People (1765).  See Johann Gottfried Herder, “How 
Philosophy Can Become More Universal and Useful for the Benefit of the People,” Herder: 
Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 3-29. 
16 Herder also employed several methodological features which may have hampered the clear 
delivery of his message.  For instance, Herder’s writing style often lacks any grammatical 
coherence since he was opposed to any linguistic or lexical straight jacketing of language.  In his 
view, such straight jacketing was unfavorable not only to linguistic creativity and inventiveness but 
also (and much worse) to thought, since thinking was dependent on and confined in its scope by 
language so that any linguistic restriction in his mind was a constraint on human development. 
17 Forster, “Introduction,” x-xi. 
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convert and influence the direction of history.18  In order to better understand such 
a notion of historical causation it is useful to understand the process as possessing 
a horizontal and vertical dimension.  Within such an understanding, interaction in 
the horizontal sense would involve all forms of social activity whereby human 
beings, either directly or indirectly, interacted with one another throughout various 
societal relationships to create the conditions which were most representative of 
their time.  The degree to which these conditions were then seen as being 
purposive, directing individuals and groups to their sequential historical ends, 
related to history’s vertical dimension.          
All the conditions which human beings faced throughout their lives, Herder 
classified under his concept of Klima.  Herder, Barnard explains, “identifies Klima 
(somewhat sweepingly) with the total environment into which people are born, and 
includes in it elements of the most diverse nature: institutions of learning, 
constitutions, standards of living, dress, posture, amusements, and the arts, as well 
as natural products and culinary preferences; he even calls for a ‘climatology’ of 
thoughts and feelings.”19  More perplexingly, at times Klima is held to be a mere 
“medium” and, as such, incapable of initiating activity on its own; at other times, 
though, it is presented as the “global sphere of interaction” that reflects the effect 
of the interplay between human forces and their contextual molding.20  
Considering its diverse nature, Klima could perhaps best be understood as a type 
of dynamic matrix in which a human being interacted with the entire spectrum of 
environmental and social factors present within her specific socio-historic context 
with the result being that the choices which she made based on these encounters 
became the “ends” which directed her life.21   
                                                 
18 F.M Barnard, “Historical and Political Consciousness:  Herder and Rousseau,” Herder on 
Nationality, Humanity, and History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2003), 162. 
19 F.M Barnard, “Humanity and History: Causation and Continuity,” Herder on Nationality, 
Humanity, and History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 123-124. 
20 Ibid., 124. 
21 For Herder, the idea that every human being had the power to help direct the course of history is 
a recurrent and vital theme throughout his works.   For example, Herder expresses this idea with his 
comments on Martin Luther where he insists that the choices of one human being and not those of 
kings, emperors or churches helped to inspire the Protestant Reformation; as well as his echoing of 
the famous saying attributed to Archimedes—in Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity, On the 
Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul and elsewhere: “Give me a point outside the world I 
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The “ends” adopted by a human being came about in two different ways.  
First, in the most ideal sense, which Herder hoped would act as an ideal for all 
societies, these “ends” would be the byproduct of the citizens’ combined social 
activities.  This would be brought forth by a pluralistic scheme of power which 
included every individual, on some level, as an active part of the decision-making 
process.  The second possibility, which is the one which he claimed has been most 
active throughout history, involves the “ends’ adopted by a society being chosen 
by a few people.  These people then used techniques such as fear and power to 
ensure that their “ends” remained accepted social dogma.  In the case of the latter, 
these “ends”—eg., the rules of kings, empires or specific religions—were usually 
systemic social practices,  incorporated into the education and socialization 
practices which proliferated throughout society.        
According to Herder, a human being’s grounding as an individual is 
impossible without an act of authority, since acts of authority are the first and only 
means through which a human being gained her first elements of knowledge 
relating to the world.  This idea works at variety of levels, the most basic being 
that a child’s disposition is usually bestowed upon her at an early age by her 
parents and then reinforced throughout her life by the influence of her surrounding 
social environment.  For Herder, the ethos of any civilization is perpetuated in the 
values that human beings have internalized and communicated back to one 
another.  Using the example of a mother, Herder explains how a person’s “ends” 
are shaped by the first authority which she encounters, her parents:  
 
She put dispositions of manifoldness into the heart, and then a part of the 
manifoldness in a circle about us, available to us; then she reined in the 
human view so that after a small period of habituation this circle became 
horizon for him.  Not to look beyond it, hardly to suspect beyond it!22    
 
                                                                                                                                      
will move the world.”  See Johann Gottfried Herder, “This Too a Philosophy for the Formation of 
Humanity,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 314, 315; and Johann Gottfried Herder, “On the Cognition and Sensation 
of the Human Soul,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 216. 
22 Herder, “This Too a Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity,” 297. 
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For Herder, the grounding of a human being on a form of authority points 
to what he saw to be a fundamental error in the philosophies of his time: namely, 
that reason could be innate to a human being.  Opposed to such an idea, he held 
that the inclinations of a human being (such as being able to reason) are taught, 
increasing only if she chose to or is forced to exercise and expand her faculties.  
Herder also felt that mental growth and the worldviews which people adopted 
almost always related back to qualities such as authority.  A human being’s first 
encounter with authority, he maintained, moved her away from her natural 
disposition—being innocent at birth, susceptible to ideas and eager to please those 
around her—to become the recipients of the worldview which characterized her 
time.23  Herder elaborates:  
 
Is there not in every human life an age in which we learn nothing through 
dry and cold reason, but through inclination, formation, in obedience to 
authority, everything?  In which we have no ear, no sense, no soul for 
pondering and rationalizing about the good, true, and beautiful, but have 
everything for the so-called prejudice and impressions of upbringing?24   
 
The “pressure of ideas,” along with Klima, education, and authority, all 
occupy a central spot within Herder’s description of historical causation.  Not only 
are they the products of human choice, thereby relating to history’s particular 
cause, but they also reveal an important element to his historical thesis: that the 
striving undertaken by human beings is of necessity purposive, and hence 
possesses a directional force which is capable of influencing the course of history.  
In addition to this, Herder also claimed that history’s directional process involves a 
type of moral unfolding, the movement of all nations and, thus, all people towards 
increased states of Humanität.  According to Herder, history’s movement towards 
Humanität is a manifestation of his universal cause of history; it is the movement 
of Kraft.   
                                                 
23 A human being’s original nature or disposition is mentioned by Herder at the outset of 
Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity where he alludes to the impressionable nature of both 
children as well as the Orient, the very group with which he chooses to start off his theory of 
history.  See Herder, “This Too a Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity,” 272-280 
24 Ibid., 276. 
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Positing a universal cause to history presented Herder with two problems: 
the first relates to how he could achieve a synthesis between his two historical 
causes (especially since both seemed to elude reconciliation) and the second 
involves the difficulties of actually proving the existence of a universal cause.  In 
the case of the second problem, part of the trouble lies in the fact that it is possible 
for Herder’s particular cause, but not his universal one, to claim acceptance as an 
observational hypothesis.  For example, while the claim that history is determined 
by the self-chosen “ends” of individuals and Völker may be considered provable 
by examining the interactions between people and civilizations which have yielded 
new historical developments, the same examination cannot verify history’s moral 
unfolding.   
In order to better understand why Herder felt the need to posit a 
metaphysical cause the standard view of causation should be briefly explained.  
Within the ordinary empirical view of causation it is presupposed that an event, a 
cause, which is separate from another event, the effect, and earlier than the effect 
in point of time, brings about or determines the latter.  Therefore, when someone 
claims that “A causes B” it means not only that B follows A, but also that B results 
from A, in that A is the sufficient condition for the occurrence of B.25  What this 
evidently points to is some type of causal connection involving the two events in 
question, the most obvious type being an external variable or additional event.   
Herder was aware that an external cause (one which examined the 
interactions between people and Völker) could not be used to explain history’s 
moral unfolding.  As a result, his only choice became the acceptance of an internal 
cause, what he labeled Kraft.  As an encompassing cause for all of existence, Kraft 
is held to be a single psycho-physical force which negates the distinction between 
mind and matter and the differences between material and immaterial 
“substances.”  It is the ultimate fusion of all natural and creative phenomena, 
linking together the human mind (and understanding) with historical causation.  In 
Kraft, Barnard explains, “[Herder] saw both a first cause and the subsequent 
energizing power of ‘becoming,’ the core of all existence.  And since he thought of 
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this power not merely as an external force acting upon the universe but as an 
internal one acting through the universe, the universe itself is a manifestation of 
Kraft, the divine source of people’s active being in the world.”26  For Herder, Kraft 
is both the operation throughout history of God’s divine plan and the force which 
motivates human beings towards greater “ends.”  It is his way of synthesizing the 
particular and universal causes of historical causation.     
Despite not being empirically verifiable, Herder felt that the existence of 
Kraft is a fact, the principles of which would likely be discovered some time in the 
future.  As it happens, Herder actually took the idea of Kraft from the precritical 
Kant and Isaac Newton, who had also explicitly affirmed the mysterious nature, 
incomprehensible to reason, of forces such as gravity.  The troublesome aspect in 
Herder’s concept of those communicating fluids lay in the fact that for him those 
forces displayed an essentially active character, creating new forms of life, in a 
sense whose specific nature, however, he could not still define.27  Like gravity, he 
felt that Kraft could be deduced from phenomena, with only its ultimate cause 
lying beyond the reach of observation.  For Herder, Kraft was then objective in the 
sense that it presented itself in the world of external forms, while at the same time 
(like gravity, electricity and other material-immaterial substances) placing itself 
beyond the senses.28  Herder comments on Kraft: 
 
Certainly I know that I think, yet know not my thinking faculty; as 
certainly do I feel and feel that I live, though I know not what the vital 
principle [Kraft] is.  This principle is innate, organical, and genetic: it is the 
basis of my natural powers, the internal genius of my being.29 
 
To a large degree, Kraft eluded proper understanding because the study of 
history largely focused on explaining causation exclusively through “external 
causes,” such as the proceedings of kings or great men.  Such an orientation, 
                                                 
26 Barnard, “Humanity and History: Causation and Continuity,” 113. 
27 Elias Palti, “The ‘Metaphor of Life’: Herder’s Philosophy of History and Uneven Developments 
in Late Eighteenth-Century Natural Sciences,” History and Theory, vol. 38 no. 3 (October 1999) 
334. 
28 Ibid., 335. 
29 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Book VII,” Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, trans. T. 
Churchill (New York: Bergman Publishers, 1968), 179. 
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Herder maintained, prevented human beings from recognizing the true causes 
behind historical causation, thereby serving as barrier which prohibited human 
beings from cultivating the many insights which would be evident once history’s 
moral trajectory was properly understood.  With history being understood solely as 
a process which is determined by the actions of great men, a fundamental 
characteristic of humanity remained continually obscured: that all human beings 
try to attract and cultivate as much happiness as their socio-historic situations will 
permit them.  This continual striving towards happiness, as well as the virtues 
which were associated with such a process, Herder tried to explain with his 
concept of Humanität.          
For Herder, Humanität is something which human beings alone are capable 
of, learning and developing it within themselves, throughout their lives.  The 
supreme aim of all human activities was thus to discover and define Humanität 
and to point towards its achievement.30  Moreover, since history is the process 
wherein human beings encounter the idiosyncrasies specific to their socio-historic 
context, trying to cultivate the degree of Humanität which is possible within those 
conditions, the proper study of history, for Herder, also became one of the primary 
aims of philosophy and social education.31  Briefly described, this “proper” study 
involved the capability of viewing each culture as being its own “whole” which 
responded to its given Klima in way that is influenced in part by its specific socio-
historic context, as well as its distinctive Volk culture.  The proper study of history 
required an “inner study” of all historical events and social situations.   
According to Herder, this new orientation in philosophy and education 
required a certain capacity fundamental to properly understanding all social 
situations, both historical and present.  Herder believed that if a human being is to 
be properly understood, in all her activities and productions, then she must be 
understood in her complete entirety.  For this a capacity is required which he was 
the first to call Einfühlung.  The process of Einfühlung entails “entering” or 
“feeling your way into” the subject before you.  It is a total outlook which includes 
                                                 
30 Alexander Gilles, Herder (London: Basil Blackwell, 1945), 80.  
31 Herder, “This Too a Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity,” 342. 
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the projection of oneself into a variety of subjects including the individual 
character of a person or an artistic movement, a literature, a social organization or 
institution, a people or nation and culture or a period of history.32  
As might be expected, Einfühlung relates directly to the discovery and 
cultivation of Humanität.  Since Humanität is not a fixed concept that can be 
identified in any given context, a practical type of understanding or sensitivity 
involving what it is to be human in a variety of diverse situations is required.  One 
aspect of what this sensitivity involves—negatively expressed—is an enlarged 
imaginative grasp of the pervasively painful and humiliating.33  What this basically 
entails is viewing the history of other human beings and Völker in such a way that 
you can truly “understand” not only their goals, triumphs and joys but also their 
fears, failures and pains.  When applied either to an educational endeavor, such as 
the study of history, or an everyday occurrence, Einfühlung, Herder felt, could 
then help a human being to deepen her Besonnenheit (reflection), her potential to 
enhance that sensitivity which Heidegger has called Mitsein, the perception of 
being in a world shared with others.34  Herder explains:  
 
Every nation must gradually come to feel it as unpleasant when another 
nation gets disparaged and abused; there must gradually awaken a common 
feeling so that every nation feels itself into the position of every other one.  
People will hate the impudent transgressor of foreign rights, the destroyer 
of foreign welfare, the brazen abuser of foreign ethics and opinions, the 
boastful imposer of his own advantages on peoples who do not want 
them.35  
   
For Herder, Einfühlung is made possible by the capabilities involved with 
the capacity for language.  According to Herder, a human being is able to acquire 
concepts by means of a sort of metaphorical extension from empirical ones.  The 
                                                 
32 Roger Hausheer, “Three Major Originators of the Concept of Verstehen,” Verstehen and 
Humane Understanding, ed. Anthony O’Hear Royal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 53. 
33 F.M Barnard, “Nationality and Humanity:  Heine and Herder,” Herder on Nationality, Humanity, 
and History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 77. 
34 F.M Barnard, “The Dynamics of Culture and ‘Globalization,’” Herder on Nationality, Humanity 
and History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 130. 
35 Johann Gottfried Herder, “Letters for the Advancement of Humanity,” Herder: Philosophical 
Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 406-407. 
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birth of language in a human being (one of her first applications of self-reflection 
and creativity) is a process where she creates meaning from experienced 
sensations by way of metaphorical extension.36  As a result, Herder holds that 
since all humans share certain physiological characteristics with one another, as 
well as certain spheres of understanding which are connected by a wealth of 
effective historical connections and consequences, that reflective thought could be 
used to draw on such commonalities to “feel” or better understand the perspective 
of others.  This, he held, could then open the way for a deepening of sympathies 
involving others and in this manner allow for the recognition of certain destructive 
patterns of thought and action which typically precede situations which hinder the 
development of Humanität.   
Einfühlung is also Herder’s most direct approach of overcoming the belief 
that one’s own perspective or Volk is the best and most correct.  While this attitude 
can take many forms and can be caused by a number of variables, Herder felt that 
it could usually be traced back to an improper education, which focused on self-
centered tendencies and not being-with-others.  For Herder, these “self-centered” 
tendencies typically included attributes such as “ignorance or pride (two dear 
sisters who never leave each other’s side),” which, in turn, cause human beings to 
reject new “manners of thought and comprehension.”37  In actual fact, it would be 
no stretch to claim that the degree to which these two sisters are present either in 
an individual or a Volk typically correlate negatively with the degree of Humanität 
which is present within those same circumstances.  Where these attitudes 
flourished Humanität typically could not.  Herder explains:  
 
Where there is evil the cause of evil is the corrupted character of our 
species, not its nature and character.  Sloth, impudence, pride, error, 
callousness, causelessness, prejudices, bad education, bad habit—through 
and through evils that are avoidable or curable if new life, diligence for 
                                                 
36 For Herder’s account of how sensation and cognition are linked together to produce 
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good, reason, modesty, justice, truth, a better education, better habits from 
youth on, arrive individually and universally; ... it is the purpose of our 
species, the goal of our destiny, to free ourselves of this corrupted 
character.38 
 
An additional characteristic which could hinder the development of 
Humanität is the viewing and judging of others from a set of standards which is 
thought to be universally true for all humans.  What Herder finds extremely 
revolting with this approach is that it is typically accompanied by a form of 
myopic universalism which is inclined to judge every variant from itself as being 
deviant, thereby denying the openness which is necessary for progress (for 
example, the type which could be gained through the consideration of alternative 
ideas or ways of being).  Such an approach Herder not only saw throughout his 
lifetime evident in those social theories which, using instrumental rationality, tried 
to reduce human behavior to a set of common mathematical laws, but also 
throughout history, whose chronicle gave evidence of countless situations where 
similar attitudes hampered the development of Humanität.   
Since Herder held that the conflicts associated with a plurality of values are 
typically the byproduct of a poor education, his approach towards pluralism 
focused on addressing that problem.  Herder explains: “[i]n the case of radical evil, 
attack the roots; they bear the tree with its top and twigs.”39  Broadly categorized, 
the Herderian approach to pluralism depends on the following notions: first, the 
need to establish a sense of social and historical embeddedness which can act as a 
source of internal cohesion between diverse groups; second, ensuring that this 
same sense of embeddedness will allow for the optimal level of creativity possible 
within the given circumstances, thus allowing for a communicative-based response 
to emerging problems; and lastly, the realization that coming to grips with moral 
diversity may not only call for different methods of enquiry, such as methods that 
demand a cognitive sensitivity towards the uniquely individual and culturally 
diverse, but also the need for an educational process which advocates virtues such 
as open-mindedness, tolerance and self-restraint.    
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39 Ibid., 422.  
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Herder’s national-political thinking rests on his belief that human beings 
should feel as if they are embedded within a larger whole which forms a matrix (in 
the most literal sense of the term) that surrounds their existence and 
development.40  This whole is thought of not in terms of a homogeneous substance 
but rather as an ensemble made up of a great variety of smaller wholes which are 
self-regulating units in their own right.  What he envisioned, therefore, is not 
centralized collectivism, in which constituent parts are forged into unity by a 
dominant centre of power, but a kind of partnership between distinct institutions 
and associations within a political structure free from any major center of 
pressure.41  Involvement in this political association involves participation within a 
diffuse framework constituted by diverse bases of activity and power which are 
energized by the group and not the individual as the core representative unit of 
political association.   
Within Herder’s group-pluralism, the most active political participants and 
effective sources of multiple powers are the representatives of the diverse groups 
and institutions which sustain the political culture in a narrow sense.42  These 
representatives are to be selected by their peers as the best persons for certain 
projects, with their sphere of competence and range of power being strictly 
limited, starting and ending with the tasks which had been allotted to them.43  In 
this way Herder’s conception of an institutional structure for a political community 
tries to avoid the creation of social divisions, or a sense of alienation, which might 
occur by way of a highly centralized or preferential political apparatus, by 
focusing instead on a pluralistic scheme of power which strives to be both 
institutionally diffuse and overtly inclusive.  
Required in the maintenance of Herder’s pluralistic system is a sense of 
embeddedness whose origins can be traced to his linguistic theory.  The basic 
                                                 
40 F.M Barnard, “The Hebraic Roots of Herder’s Nationalism,” Herder on Nationality, Humanity, 
and History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 27. 
41 Ibid., 27. 
42 According to Barnard, Herder’s pluralism is unique in that it sought to combine an essentially 
communitarian ethic with the liberal idea of individual rights and freedoms.  This, interestingly, 
makes Herder an early proponent of the type of group pluralism which many contemporary 
thinkers, such as Will Kymlicka, have tried to develop.  See Barnard, “The Hebraic Roots of 
Herder’s Nationalism,” 37. 
43 Barnard, “The Dynamics of Culture and ‘Globalization,’” 157. 
 32
nature of Herderian embeddedness can be recognized as falling on a continuum 
which moves from the social level, inspired by grassroots participation, through 
the political, and into the historical (or transcendental).  In the social realm, a 
human being comes to realize her importance within the larger collective whole 
through various forms of communicative interaction.  In a typically liberal fashion, 
Herder believes that open public discussion and freedom of speech allows for 
contested ideas to compete with one another in order to create better ones.  
Boundless, but totally inclusive, social activity, free of any coercive power, then 
helps people to coexist by creating social cohesion through the realization that the 
entire speech community participates in creating the policies which come to be the 
collective “ends” of the community.44   
The historical sense of embeddedness follows from the policies which are 
adopted by a Volk.  Just as the “ends” adopted by a Volk are the byproducts of an 
elaborate process of interaction and discussion, so too are those which direct the 
course of nations and history.  Together, all social interactions, starting with those 
between individuals and moving to the larger ones between nations, are part of the 
process whereby the pressure of ideas determines the course of history.  As a 
result, the addition of Kraft into Herder’s theory of historical causation is his way 
of ensuring that the social differences present in individuals and cultures have a 
divine purpose: specifically, they are the a cultural source which supplies the 
ideas, knowledge, and experiences needed to create greater conditions of 
Humanität.  Herder explains: “[t]he original form, the prototype of humanity hence 
lies not in a single nation of a single region of the earth; it is the abstracted concept 
from all exemplars of human nature in both hemispheres.”45 
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In order to initiate the process whereby human beings view other cultures 
as a resource useful in cultivating Humanität requires instilling the necessary 
attitudes within the public’s mind, such as attitudes conducive to free discussion, 
tolerance, open-mindedness, and so forth.  To accomplish this Herder proposes an 
extensive education process.  The means through which this process is to take 
place involves harnessing the very attitudes present within a human being’s 
original nature.  Briefly recalled, Herder claims that a person’s natural disposition 
(such as the one which is evident in the outlook of a child or humankind’s 
forefathers, the Orient) is one characterized by qualities like innocence, a 
susceptibility to new ideas, and an eagerness to please.  In a way similar to how 
parents and early historical despots took advantage of these qualities, Herder also 
suggests that this disposition should be used to induce the necessary, Herderian 
inspired, worldview.  The only difference with Herder’s suggestion is in the fact 
that the precise policies used to actualize this ideal would be determined by the 
entire political community.     
The core channels by which Herder saw this Humanität-inspired education 
program being formed and perpetuated involved language, religion, and history.  
While it is clear that Herder’s philosophy of Humanität is an eloquent affirmation 
of the hope that the “ends” chosen by societies could come to achieve the status of 
meaningful ethical universals, in terms which people everywhere might strive to 
emulate, it is also apparent that he was not blind to the realization that this hope 
relied heavily on its acceptance by other human beings.  If the truth be told, the 
entire philosophical ideal of Humanität and its social application is contingent on 
its acceptance by human beings in such a way that its flourishing depends on a 
collective agreement of self-restraint and moral exploration.  That is, Humanität 
requires the development of virtues and moral arguments which could be used to 
guide the lives of people.  For Herder, the potential to engage in this activity first 
emerged in the capacity of language and reached its highest actualization in 
religion.    
According to Herder, the first germ of attaining a true consciousness of 
humanity involves the recognition of the limits within which a human being could 
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choose.  Language and religion, as such, went together for Herder, and both, in his 
view, promote the attainment of a consciousness of limits.  Of the two, language 
constitutes the basic causality, in that religion seems impossible without the 
existence of language.46  For example, while language enables human beings to 
form concepts, to reason and to think, its emergence and growth is largely 
connected with the perception of being in a world which is shared with others.  
Without language, consciousness itself would not be what it is and without 
consciousness, or its first emergence, religion could not be born.  Herder indicates 
that while language is, as it were, the ground upon which religion grows, religion, 
in turn, is the source on which a consciousness of limits and moral exploration 
feeds.47  
Herder’s approach to religion, as with every other facet of his social 
philosophy, is largely ecumenical.  It could not be exactly the same for two people, 
let alone for two different cultures, but still played an important part in a larger 
transcendental purpose.48  Religion is an ongoing process in which a human being, 
through her innermost linguistically inspired awareness, becomes aware of herself 
as a part of an ongoing historical universe.  Associated with this awareness are 
considerations such as what she should do or strive to “become” throughout her 
life, how she should go about doing it and, most significantly, how she should act 
as a human being.  Religion is the continual conscious growth which a human 
being undergoes by trying to determine her social obligations, as well as the limits 
within which she could act.  Herder explains: “[r]eligion is supposed to affect 
nothing but purposes through human beings and for human beings—whether it is 
leaven or treasure, each human being carries it in his container, mixes it with his 
dough!”49 
Worthy of mention is that for Herder religion and the church are not one; 
while religion unites, he felt theological dogmas divided, breeding fanaticism and 
intolerance.  Religion is not a matter of external organization but rather the 
                                                 
46 F.M Barnard, “Humanism and Titanism: Masaryk and Herder,” Herder on Nationality, 
Humanity, and History (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), 93. 
47 Ibid., 93. 
48 Barnard, Herder’s Social and Political Thought, 90. 
49 Herder, “This Too a Philosophy for the Formation of Humanity,” 305. 
 35
innermost concern of each individual.  It couples together autonomous self-
direction with self-restraint to create the inalienable sphere through which a human 
being’s highest nature (her Humanität) could be most fully developed.  Religious 
values, in short, are the way of producing the perimeters needed for the growth and 
understanding associated with Humanität.   
Accompanying the religious virtues used to promote a consciousness of 
limits is the proper study of history and literature.  Herder believed that through 
the study of history and literature several benefits could be gained which would 
aid in an individual’s edification.   For example, by studying people’s minds 
through their literature, visual arts, etc., the possibility exists whereby a person 
might enhance her sympathies for people at all social levels, including lower ones.  
Moreover, an “inner” study of history and literature (that being one which uses the 
capacity of Einfühlung) could also act as an important instrument for self-
improvement, such as serving to enhance a human being’s own self- 
understanding. 50  One reason for this is that it is by, and only by, contrasting one’s 
own outlook with the outlooks of other peoples that one recognizes what is 
universal and invariant in it and what, by contrast, is distinctive and variable.  
Another very important reason is that in order fully to understand one’s own 
outlook, one needs to identify its origins and how it developed into its present 
form.51 
In a very important sense, the study of history and literature allows a 
human being to enrich her own ideals by understanding past ages and diverse 
circumstances frequently captured within various literary works.  What this points 
to is Herder’s recognition that dialogical situations, especially in the reflection on 
what may appear to be Other, proves to be decisive for a human being’s own 
identity formation.  As Hans-Georg Gadamer has formulated it, one’s historicity is 
achieved in the effective history of those one encounters, who occasion in us a 
redefinition of our own horizons.52  In accordance with dialogical nature of 
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knowledge, Herder advocates the study of other cultures’ effective histories and 
literary works, as well as the cultivation of one’s own, in order to advance one’s 
own understanding, while also producing the material which could also assist in 
the growth of others. 
Herder’s final response to the questions associated with pluralism should 
now be clear.  Can common positions be established within a pluralistic age?  For 
Herder, the plurality of values and the conflicts which it could cause is an 
inescapable aspect of living within the linguistic dimension.  Given the relativistic 
nature of his entire philosophy it also seems unlikely that Herder believed that a 
truly universal set of morals could ever be established.  Nevertheless, it is obvious 
that he believed that working towards such a goal is worthwhile and should be 
pursued; but with an awareness of the integrity of other cultures.  In fact, Herder’s 
entire philosophy is a reaffirmation of the hope that human beings could 
eventually come to coexist with one another, celebrating and learning from each 
other’s differences, while also working together to create a better world.  What he 
vehemently disagreed with was the systematization or creation of a moral system 
which restricted communication or was completely static; since such systems, he 
felt, had to continually grow and change with the people to which they are bound. 
The incommensurability of values did not entail immediate conflict for 
Herder, but rather resulted in such a state only when a human being strayed from 
her better nature.  While it is true that he felt that some pursued “ends” would 
inevitably result in conflict, he also recognized that in many circumstances people 
would come to agree that some “ends” are preferable to others.  Capacities which 
he associated with the emergence of language, combined with the fact that human 
beings are connected by a wealth of shared physiological, social and historical 
experiences, are only a few of the qualities he felt are common amongst all 
peoples.  Harnessing these similarities as a way of establishing common positions, 
as well as advancing humanity, is assisted by an education process which uses 
Einfühlung to promote virtues associated with the betterment of humanity, such as 
tolerance, communication and increased political participation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Isaiah Berlin 
 
 
In 1965, Isaiah Berlin published his first essay on Herder.  A series of 
republications, with minor alterations, soon followed. 1  One of the primary 
accomplishments which Berlin is credited with within these works lies in his 
introduction of Herder to the Anglophone world.  This is largely achieved through 
his exclusive focus on what he finds truly original in Herder’s views, what he 
labels populism, expressionism, and pluralism.2   Briefly summarized, Berlin 
identifies populism as the belief in the value of belonging to a group or a culture, 
which for Herder, at least, is not political but perhaps even anti-political.  
Expressionism (or what Taylor labels, taking his lead from Berlin, expressivism) 
involves the notion that human activity (in general) and art (in particular) express 
the entire personality of the individual or group, while pluralism includes the 
belief in the multiplicity and incommensurability of different cultures, and, in 
addition, in the incompatibility of equally valid ideals, together with the implied 
                                                 
1  Berlin’s first work on Herder, Herder and the Enlightenment, first began as a lecture delivered at 
Johns Hopkins University in 1964.  See Isaiah Berlin, “Herder and the Enlightenment,” Aspects of 
the Eighteenth Century, ed., Earl R. Wasserman (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1965).  It was 
later revised and reprinted several times; see Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas 
(New York: Viking, 1976; London: Hogarth Press, 1976); “Herder and the Enlightenment,” The 
Proper Study of Mankind, ed., Henry Hardy (London, UK: Pimlico, 1998); and lastly, Three Critics 
of the Enlightenment:  Vico, Hamann, Herder (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000; 
London, UK: Pimlico, 2000). 
2 By focusing exclusively on Herder’s original ideas, Berlin acknowledges that it is unfortunately 
necessary to omit much else which is relevant and interesting: for example, Herder’s dominant 
influence on Romanticism, vitalism, and existentialism, and, above all, on psychology, which he all 
but founded; as well as the use made of his imprecise, often inconsistent, but always many-faceted 
and stimulating thought by such thinkers as the Schlegles and Jakob Grimm (especially in their 
philological excursions), Savigny (who applied to law Herder’s notion of organic national growth), 
Görres (whose nationalism is rooted in, even if it distorts, Herder’s vision), Hegel (whose concepts 
of becoming and of the growth of the personality of impersonal institutions began their lives in 
Herder’s pages), as well as historical geographers, social anthropologists, philosophers of language 
and history, and historical writers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Berlin, “Herder and 
the Enlightenment,” 361. 
 38
revolutionary corollary that the classical notions of an ideal human being and of an 
ideal society are intrinsically incoherent and meaningless.3 
According to Berlin, each of the previous ideas is relatively novel since 
each is incompatible with the central moral, historical, and aesthetic doctrines 
associated with the Enlightenment.  While acknowledging that each of these theses 
is ineluctably bound up in Herder’s thought, Berlin signifies populism to be the 
most relevant.  Berlin explains: the whole thrust of Herder’s doctrines is 
systematic relativism which, both in his early and later works, “… is to show and 
celebrate the uniqueness, the individuality and, above all, the incommensurability 
with one another of each of the civilizations which he so lovingly describes and 
defends.”4   
Herder’s importance for Berlin lies in the notion of cultural distinctiveness 
which he uses to understand the whole of Herder’s thought.  Elements of Herder’s 
philosophy which are not indicative of this thesis are dismissed as being the by-
products of a thinker who at the best of times was far from clear in explaining 
precisely what he meant or dismissed as being incoherent with the larger 
relativistic trend readily identifiable throughout his work.  If Herder’s notion of the 
equal validity of incommensurable cultures is to be accepted, Berlin alleges, 
“concepts of an ideal State or of an ideal man become incoherent.”5  
Consequently, ideas which were vital to the Herderian cosmology—such as 
expressivism, the continual striving towards the ideal of Humanität, the social and 
transcendental sense of embeddedness which he tried to create with his theory of 
historical causation, and the education process which his entire system entails—
are either not carefully considered by Berlin or quickly discarded based on their 
alleged inauthenticity in light of Herder’s relativistic thesis.   
Berlin misrepresents Herder in such a way that his thought appears more 
closely aligned with Berlin’s own theory of pluralism, rather than the system 
which Herder had in fact intended.  While recognizing that Herder did write with 
optimism and eloquence about a human being’s ascent to the ideal of Humanität, 
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Berlin does not believe, as he explains: “… that anyone who reads Herder’s work 
with the Einfühlung for which he asks … will sustain the impression that it is this 
ideal … that filled his mind.”6  The heart of Herder’s thought, Berlin felt, is the 
theme of relativism to which he constantly returned:   
 
[T]hat one must not judge one culture by the criteria of another; that 
differing civilizations are different growths, pursue different goals, embody 
different ways of living, are dominated by different attitudes to life; so that 
to understand them one must perform an imaginative act of “empathy” into 
their essence, understand them “from within” as far as possible, and see the 
world through their eyes.7  
Once accepted, the idea of incommensurability for Berlin dispenses with the 
notion that a perfect civilization in which a human could realize her full (or 
greater) potentialities could be actualized either as a determinative state or one 
which could act as an ideal to be continually strived for.  The idea of a process 
where one striving state continually replaced another, drawing humanity onward to 
greater “ends,” Berlin alleged, is patently absurd; constantly running the risk of 
sliding into states such as conflict, annexation, and tyranny.  As a result, the 
picture which Berlin leaves of Herder is of a thinker who praised the diversity of 
different cultures so much that their distinctiveness appears to exclude any 
possibility at reconciliation between diverse social “ends.” 
In Berlin’s rendering of Herder no common grounds appear to exist between 
diverse cultures—whether linguistically, physiologically, or historically—which 
could be used as a starting point to avoid conflict and establish common social 
positions.  By trumping Herder’s theme of Humanität with his notion of 
relativism, Berlin does away with a central aspect of the Herderian philosophical 
system, thereby eliminating his entire formula for addressing social diversity.  The 
impression then produced is one where Berlin’s own views on pluralism can be 
easily read into Herder’s thought.  Berlin’s views on pluralism include his central 
belief that values are incommensurable and run the risk of immediately sliding into 
conflict.  He attributes this slide to three factors: methods of thinking which relate 
everything in reality to a single vision or philosophical system; various 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 428. 
7 Ibid., 429. 
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circumstances which are operative in the cohesion of aggressive groups; and, 
lastly, social actions which are associated with positive liberty or actions involving 
self-determination.   
For Berlin, the incommensurability of values is a fact which he feels is evident 
from history’s vast chronicle of conflict, the origins of which are always 
attributable to a human being’s own free will.  Quoting Fichte, Berlin explains:  
“‘freedom itself produces the greatest and most terrible disorders of our race; man 
is the cruellest enemy of man.’”8  Conflict results because an individual’s free will, 
accompanied by her creativity, allows her to either generate the “ends” which will 
come to direct her life or internalize ones which have been created by others.  
Berlin, consequently, ceaselessly draws attention to this point, claiming that there 
is no such thing as a universal set of moral rules which are true for all humans but 
only those “ends” which people themselves have either created or chosen to 
accept.   
The anti-universalistic notion of ultimate “ends” is an important theme 
throughout Berlin’s work, frequently being invoked as an argument against any 
system of thought or cultural group which claims to have achieved moral 
objectivity.  According to Berlin, the belief in moral objectivity is a fallacy which 
is continually perpetuated throughout Western thought.  Berlin explains:  
 
If I may be permitted an almost unpardonable degree of simplification and 
generalization, I should like to suggest that the central core of the intellectual 
tradition in the West has, since Plato (or it may be Pythagoras), rested upon 
three unquestioned dogmas: (a) that to all genuine questions there is one true 
answer and one only, all others being deviations from the truth and therefore 
false, and that this applies to questions of conduct and feeling, that is, to 
practice, as well as to questions of theory or observation—to questions of 
value no less than to those of fact; (b) that the true answers to such questions 
are in principle knowable; (c) that these true answers cannot clash with one 
another, for one true proposition cannot be incompatible with one another; that 
together answers must form a harmonious whole: according to some they form 
a logical system each ingredient of which logically entails and is entailed by all 
the other elements; according to others the relationship is that of parts to a 
                                                 
8 Isaiah Berlin, “The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will,” The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry 
Hardy (London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 570. 
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whole, or, at the very least, of complete compatibility of each with all the 
others.9          
 
Since these dogmas have been incorporated into the majority of social and 
theoretical systems prevalent throughout the West, Berlin claims that the ideas 
which they proclaimed, in one way or another, have become entrenched in 
conventional thought.  Conflict is therefore caused by the very fact that a human 
being could not dispense with the notion that her “ends” are objectively true, not 
only for her but for all peoples.  Berlin explains: “[w]hat is clear is that values 
clash—that is why civilizations are incompatible.  They can be incompatible 
between cultures, or groups in the same culture, or between you and me.”10  In 
every instance where conflict develops, the same basic dynamic can be seen at 
work: two or more parties are involved in a situation where each holds their views 
or “ends” to be superior to those of others.  Thus, the further their “ends” diverge 
from one another the more likely that they are going to, on some level, find 
themselves in conflict.    
Accompanying the slide into conflict is the tendency to relate everything in 
reality to a single vision or philosophical system, what Berlin refers to as being a 
hedgehog.  According to Berlin, there are two types of people: “those, on one side, 
who relate everything to a single central vision, one system … which they 
understand, think and feel” according to, seeking to fit all of their experiences into 
it; and those, on the other side, “who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even 
contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for some 
psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or aesthetic principle.”11  
The first kind of personality are hedgehogs, while the second are to be considered 
foxes.12  What Berlin finds problematic with hedgehogs is that their mindset bears 
a remarkable similarity to the type which he also associates with the dogmas 
                                                 
9 Berlin, “The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will,” 555. 
10 Isaiah Berlin, “The Pursuit of the Ideal,” The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry Hardy 
(London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 10.  
11 Isaiah Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry Hardy 
(London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 436. 
12 This idea is best presented by Berlin in his essay on Tolstoy and history where he starts by 
quoting the Greek poet Archilochus who says: “the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog 
knows one big thing.”  See Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,”436-498. 
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prevalent throughout Western thought, since both involve the same type of 
inflexible mindset where a person believes her values, understanding, or approach 
towards existence is true, not only for her, but for all peoples.          
For Berlin, the tendencies which cause conflict can also be heightened once a 
person becomes a member of a group.  He explains, “[t]he need to belong to an 
easily identifiable group has been regarded, at any rate since Aristotle, as a natural 
requirement on the part of human beings: families, clans, tribes, estates, social 
orders, classes, religious organizations, political parties, and finally nations and 
States, are the historical forms which involve the fulfillment of this basic human 
need.”13  Yet by fulfilling this natural requirement, the danger exists that cohesion 
(provided that certain circumstances are met) can quickly slide into an area where 
the group might become uncontrollable and dangerous.  The best example of 
group cohesion which has proven to be destructive can be found in the aggressive 
forms of nationalism and ethnic-inspired conflicts which have plagued the world, 
most noticeably in the last century.  
The causes of the type of cohesion which results in the formation of aggressive 
groups can be attributed to many sources, such as the destruction or threatening of 
a person’s social life, depriving people of their emotional security, 
dehumanization, as well as various other phenomena which produce feelings of 
alienation, spiritual homelessness and anomie.  In  all of these instances, or any 
other where a person believes that they are being deprived of something 
significant, the typical response usually entails trying to fill the “void” with some 
type of emotional, psychological or physical equivalent.  In the case of the 
formation of an aggressive group, as in the case of nationalism, this vacuum, 
Berlin explains:  
 
[Is] filled neither by professional associations, nor by political parties, nor by 
revolutionary myths … but by the old, traditional bonds—language, the soil, 
historical memories real and imaginary—and by the institutions or leaders 
                                                 
13 Isaiah Berlin, “Nationalism:  Past Neglect and Present Power,” The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. 
Henry Hardy (London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 586 
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which function as the incarnations of men’s conceptions of themselves as a 
community.14   
 
In extreme instances, where a group has been, for instance, emotionally, 
psychologically or economically deprived over a prolonged period of time, the 
need for an “equivalent” can result in feelings of aggression towards the group or 
sector held responsible for creating the given deprivation.  For Berlin, these 
feelings typically lead to the beginning of some form of political 
anthropomorphism where the group, nation or a process of history is transformed 
into a super-sensible agent, whose unbounded will the members of the group 
identify with their own finite desires.15  The group, consequently, becomes a way 
for its members to understand themselves, their significance, and what they should 
and could be when they are at their best.  According to Berlin, the next sequence in 
this development is that any individual or group who is not a member of the newly 
formed group is typically held to be a hindrance or rival to the actualization of its 
will.  The response to such a dilemma is obvious: since ultimate values conflict, 
conversion or conflict between groups become the only options. 
Underlying the cohesion of a group and its slide into conflict is the subtle but 
extremely influential sentiment of recognition.  Berlin elaborates: “[w]e often 
speak of demands for liberty made by oppressed classes or nationalities.  But it is 
not always individual freedom, nor even individual equality, that they primarily 
want. … What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition.”16  Berlin 
continues: “[w]hat most groups desire which resort to aggressive tactics is simply 
recognition of their class or nation, or colour or race—as an independent source of 
human activity, with a will of their own, which they intend to act in accordance 
with (whether it is good, or legitimate, or not).”17   
While satisfying the demand for recognition may appear to be a viable option 
for addressing moral diversity and forestalling conflict, it is nonetheless, Berlin 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 601. 
15 Berlin, “The Apotheosis of the Romantic Will,” 570. 
16 Isaiah Berlin, “The Search for Status,” The Power of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, New 
Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 2000), 195. 
17 Ibid., 195. 
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maintains, inescapably bound up with the incommensurability of values and its 
relationship to self-determination.  The ability to pursue the “ends” determined by 
one’s will, whether they are the by-product of one person or those of an entire 
group, Berlin classifies under the term positive liberty.  Positive freedom refers to 
a specific capacity: a “freedom to,” for instance, be one’s own master.  As a result, 
positive freedom’s “positiveness” often involves the conditions necessary for a 
specific type of freedom—whether that is the possession of various material 
resources, a level of social enlightenment, or the opportunity for political 
participation—but in all instances it is characterized by the ability, in some form, 
to be one’s own master.  It is involved in the answer to the question “What, or 
who, is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do (or 
be) this rather than that?”18  At the same time, it is also associated with education, 
self-actualization, and any other pursuit which attempts to bring a human being 
closer to some type of ideal or improved state.   
The basic problem with recognition is that all human beings, in groups or not, 
want recognition, as well the eventual actualization of their individual or collective 
“will,” whatever that may be.  Yet achieving these goals depends on the ability to 
pursue one’s own “ends” which Berlin ultimately envisions as always culminating 
in forms of oppression.  Berlin explains: “‘[f]reedom for the pike is death for the 
minnows;’ the liberty of some must depend on the restraint of others.”19  As a 
result, in order to protect people from the boundless pursuits of positive liberty, the 
ultimate source of all conflict, Berlin suggests that people submit themselves to its 
opposite, negative liberty.   
As a counter to positive liberty, negative liberty is involved in answering the 
question: “[w]hat is the area within which the subject—a person or group of 
persons—is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without 
interference by other persons.”20  It is the choice among alternatives or options that 
                                                 
18 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry Hardy 
(London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 194. 
19 Ibid., 196. 
20 Ibid., 194. 
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is unimpeded by others;21 while, at the same time, also being the physical area in 
which a human being could interact freely.  Forms of negative liberty have had a 
long historical presence within social situations, being the customary way by 
which pursuits associated with positive liberty have been blocked from sliding into 
domination.  For example, the basic principle of negative liberty can be seen 
throughout the legal frameworks which have protected and continue to protect 
humans from one another.  Berlin explains his preference for negative liberty:  
 
Pluralism, with the measure of “negative” liberty that it entails, seems to 
me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the 
great disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of “positive” self-
mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind.  It is truer because 
it does recognize the fact that human goals are many, that not all of them 
are commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another.  To assume 
that all values can be graded on one scale, so that it is a mere matter of 
inspection to determine the highest, seems to me to falsify our knowledge 
that men are free agents to represent moral decision as an operation which 
a slide-rule could, in principle, perform.22   
 
Berlin’s views on pluralism clearly differ from those of Herder.  Herder 
traces the origin of pluralism to a linguistic beginning, believing that a plurality of 
values and the conflicts which they sometimes caused were the byproduct of an 
awareness which was capable of self-reflection, creative thought and, most 
importantly, the formation of new ideas.  For Berlin, however, pluralism is not 
linguistic in origin but rather philosophical.  Berlin states this view when, in the 
course of arguing about the origins of doubts and disputes concerning social 
values, he claims that “[t]hese questions are not purely technical and empirical, not 
merely problems about the best means to a given end, nor are they mere questions 
of logical consistency, that is, formal and deductive; but properly philosophical.” 23  
Consequently, this belief caused Berlin to concern himself only with the 
philosophical problems which are a part of pluralism and not the awareness which 
is associated with their origin.   
                                                 
21 John Gray, Isaiah Berlin (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), 15. 
22 Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” 241. 
23 Isaiah Berlin, “Does Political Theory Still Exist,” The Proper Study of Mankind, ed. Henry 
Hardy (London, UK: Pimlico, 1998), 67. 
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Pluralism occurs for Berlin when a person adopts a position (typically 
philosophical in origin) and incorporates it into her own agency.  Berlin’s 
conception of human agency differs from Herder’s in the sense that, while he does 
acknowledge that people are dialogically dependent on their larger surroundings, 
he conceives of this dependence and its influence as being almost secondary to the 
power of a person’s will.  As Grey points out, Berlin’s conception of human 
agency is “of man as a self-transforming species which invents a variety of natures 
for itself.”24  What distinguishes this conception from Herder’s is, Grey continues, 
that “human nature is not, for Berlin, something within us all that awaits discovery 
and realization.  It is something invented, and perpetually reinvented, through 
choice, and it is inherently plural and diverse, not common or universal.”25  As a 
result, Berlin dismisses Herder’s belief that human nature is a teleological ideal 
which all people, whether they realize it or not, continually work their way 
towards.  At the same time, Berlin’s dismissal of teleology also denies humans the 
metaphysical comfort, which itself may come close to being a universal need, 
whereby particular forms of life are conceived as having a providential purpose.  
The approaches Herder and Berlin offer for addressing pluralism are both 
consistent with what they believe to have first caused it.  In Herder’s case, 
qualities which he associates with a linguistic awareness are the basis from which 
the problem of conflicting values is addressed.  Since all humans are linguistic 
creatures whose understanding relating to the world is brought forth by an act of 
authority, Herder believes that a similar act accompanied with qualities common to 
all peoples, such as being connected by shared experiences, could be used within 
an educational process to address the problems which might be caused by social 
diversity.  For Herder, education is indispensable in creating a stable political 
environment where all human beings are included as integral parts.  
Berlin attributes pluralism to a human being’s free will, as well as to 
various acts associated with self-determination, which likely direct his decision 
towards curbing the boundless pursuits of positive liberty with negative liberty.  
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Yet at this point, for some reason, Berlin chooses to stop; offering no suggestions 
(which are obtainable from Herder) as to how negative liberty might be applied or 
improved within a social situation.  For example, while acknowledging that 
demands involving recognition often relate back to feelings of dissatisfaction and 
deprivation, he does not address in detail how these claims might be used to 
promote social cohesiveness and prevent conflict.  Furthermore, others elements 
which might be used to prevent the conflicts associated with pluralism, such as 
educating a human being to increase her awareness about diversity or creating a 
social sense of embeddedness, are not addressed at all by Berlin.         
According to Kocis, this is because it makes a difference for Berlin as to 
how any policy which would be used to address pluralism is justified.  Kocis 
elaborates: “to implement a policy using an argument for some higher good was 
not necessarily evil; to the contrary, it was just that these policies are often so 
compelling that, in pursuing them, we inevitably lose sight of the more basic 
liberties of the negative kind.”26  As a result, Berlin’s insight, Kocis explains, is 
that “the always-present desire for some higher good or another readily provides 
some people with justifications for present indignities by appeal to some future 
good.”27 
Berlin’s exclusion of factors which might be useful in addressing diversity, 
as well as his refusal to draw out or expand on how negative liberty might be 
applied in social situations, also stems largely from his belief that positive and 
negative liberty are severable from each other.  He believed that, in historical 
terms, the two liberties have developed in such a way that they often come to stand 
for distinct values, goods, or conditions; so distinct that their actualization often 
results in them becoming rivals or competitors.28  As a result, Berlin became 
extremely unsettled by any social or political policy which resembled positive 
liberty.  In his mind, “forcing people to be free” through an education process (or 
any other policy associated with the teleological aspect of positive liberty), 
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regardless of the conceived social benefits, “was the argument used by every 
dictator, inquisitor and bully who [sought] some moral, or even aesthetic, 
justification for his conduct.”29   
According to Berlin, the problem with positive liberty lay in the historical 
fact that subsuming all people under one goal typically laid the foundations for 
violence.  If there is one teleological ideal toward which all are to develop, then 
any one who fails to see the truth of this goal is ignorant or irrational, thereby 
making the pursuit of any other end subversive in light of the pursuit of the one 
right end.  As a result, any persons who pursue other ends could be classified as 
perverse: not knowing what is truly good for them.30  For Berlin, while positive 
liberty is geared to providing people with the capacity to become better—aiming at 
creating a new, and better, society—it frequently results in tragedy.  
Berlin’s choice to focus exclusively on negative liberty as the only viable 
means of addressing pluralism—a choice reinforced by his associating positive 
liberty with the excessive anti-freedom of totalitarianism—appears needlessly 
preemptive, especially considering that many current arrangements provide several 
groups with degrees of positive freedom without the conflicts which he 
envisioned.  What Berlin therefore seems incapable of acknowledging is that the 
two liberties can and do successfully co-exist.  After all, many democracies today 
offer their citizens, to varying degrees, both: providing their citizens with some 
minimum amount of space free from coercion, while also, through various state-
sponsored policies, providing them with a way of preserving their distinctiveness 
for future generations. 
It is not inconceivable that if Berlin had not established the link between 
positive liberty and the excessive anti-freedoms of totalitarianism that his approach 
towards pluralism could have taken on an entirely different direction.  Clearly, this 
is significant since Berlin’s linkage directed him into adopting a very one-
dimensional approach which excludes all alternatives associated with positive 
liberty based on their alleged causality with an immediate slide into oppression.  
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The narrowness of Berlin’s approach to pluralism demands answers to the 
following questions: why did he feel the need to draw a distinction between the 
two liberties and what caused him to maintain this division?   
The basic cause of Berlin’s linkage between positive liberty and 
totalitarianism is likely due to the fact that he, like many academics throughout the 
Cold War period, was intent on trying to understand the authoritarian trend 
spreading throughout the world.  What interested Berlin most was the false 
consciousness associated with movements such as fascism and communism, as 
well as their method of indoctrinating the masses of people into abandoning their 
own judgments.  In order to better understand these phenomena, Berlin explored, 
in great depth, history’s most sobering example: how the Nazis had deceived the 
Jews into peacefully going to their deaths through the suggestion that they were 
being taken to a “re-settlement” in the East.  What perplexed Berlin with this case 
was why the executioners’ deception, even if it may have in fact eased the anguish 
of the victims, caused him such discontent.31  His response was straightforward: 
the source of discontent stemmed from the realization that the victims were denied 
the power to choose, they were not allowed the choice of facing their destruction 
with fear or courage. With this idea in mind, Berlin came to believe that there is a 
continuum involving the denial of human rights, such as the right to know one’s 
fate, and situations which involved atrocities against humanity.   
The Holocaust, nonetheless, was not solely responsible for fixing this 
theme at the centre of Berlin’s thought; rather, it was a confluence of pressures 
which put it there:  the rise of Marxist politics, the bi-polarization of the Cold War 
world, the subliminal thought of his own people going blindly to their deaths and, 
above all else, the fear that this atrocity could occur again.  Together these forces 
catalyzed the link between positive liberty and tyranny within Berlin’s mind, 
moving it from being only a theme, to a conviction which he pursued throughout 
his life.  Berlin’s biographer, Michael Ignatieff, explains: “[t]he fox had 
discovered that he was a hedgehog after all.  He had found ‘the one big thing’ that 
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was to order his intellectual life thereafter: the theme of freedom and its 
betrayal.”32   
For better or worse, Berlin’s pluralism is clearly informed by his 
understanding of freedom and its betrayal.  Within this understanding, a plurality 
of values almost always entails incommensurability and conflict since a person’s 
free will ensures that the “ends” which she adopts can be as diverse as the choices 
which she is capable of making.  These “ends” can also not be rated or sorted in 
some type of hierarchical scheme since any ordering sequence which seeks to 
actualize certain “ends” does so at the expense of displacing others.  Free will, 
consequently, makes the development of common moral positions exceedingly 
difficult and problematic.     
Since Berlin felt that free will is the ultimate cause of social diversity and 
conflict, he approached pluralism by seeking to curb what he believed to be 
freedom’s most destructive form: positive liberty.  Accomplishing this, 
nonetheless, required vigilance since it took on a variety of forms, often through 
the guise of optimistic outcomes which could better humanity.  With this idea in 
mind, Berlin took on an uncompromising position: all actions associated with 
positive liberty were to be controlled by the limits set by negative liberty, through 
some form of legal framework or social contract.  Ensuring that a human being’s 
rights are continually upheld is the best approach towards pluralism. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Charles Taylor 
 
 
Taylor’s usage of Herder, as a source of ideas which are useful in 
understanding and addressing the problems associated with pluralism, differs 
significantly from Berlin’s.  While Berlin identifies the systemic theme of 
relativism as the sole theme of importance in Herder’s thought, Taylor focuses on 
his innovations in language as one of his most crucial contributions to philosophy 
and pluralism.  According to Taylor, while it may be true that Herder was not the 
most rigorous of thinkers, the insights captured in his linguistic innovations have 
nonetheless inspired other, more philosophically exigent minds, to more exact 
formulations of his ideas.1  In one way or another, Herder has had a tremendous 
impact on modern culture.2   
Herder’s value lies in the fact that his linguistic innovations have assisted 
in swinging the conventional thought about language into a different view, what 
Taylor refers to as the Herderian inspired revolution.  The primary insights which 
Taylor associates with this revolution, which have already been explained in 
Chapter One, include the following notions: that expression constitutes the 
linguistic dimension, that language can only exist within a context of language 
practices, such as the Volk (the cultural community) which carries it, and, lastly, 
that language not only allows human beings to have a greater awareness about 
                                                 
1 Charles Taylor, “The Importance of Herder,” Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1997), 79. 
2 Taylor explains this idea by noting that “deeply innovative thinkers don’t have to be rigorous in 
order to originate important ideas, since the insights they capture … can inspire other, more 
philosophical exigent minds to more exact formations.”  This, he continues, is exemplified in 
Herder’s relation to Hegel, as well as his seminal role in the creation of post-Romantic thought and 
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things, but it also transforms feelings, thereby revealing new ways of responding 
to a variety of situations.3   
Herder’s innovations paint a radically different picture of human agency; 
one which, while departing from the views prevalent in Herder’s life time, also, 
and perhaps more importantly, reacted against a way of thinking which Taylor 
suggests has “colonized the common-sense positions of our civilization.”4  This 
point should be explained since Taylor gives it a significant amount of attention; 
claiming, for instance, that the Enlightenment played an important part in creating 
a form of rationality, exemplified in instrumental rationality, which has affected 
the modern notion of selfhood and increased the circumstances which lead social 
diversity into conflict.5   
While acknowledging the gains which the Enlightenment helped to initiate, 
particularly in technology and the physical sciences, Taylor claims that the method 
which it employed to make these advances caused an “ontologizing of rational 
procedure”6 which results in human beings thinking and acting as if they are 
separate from their larger surrounding environments.  This severability Taylor 
attributes to the basic characteristics of instrumental rationality, such as the 
adoption of an approach where information or other variables are isolated into 
singular components, to be added or removed, so that true causes and objective 
understandings could be established.  Indispensable to this approach is a neutrality 
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in information processing where the validity of the experiment depends on 
maintaining some form of observational disengagement.        
While instrumental rationality is undoubtedly useful within science, 
allowing variables which might influence the outcome of the experiment to be 
isolated so that reliable theories can be created, it applications within social 
situations, Taylor suggests, is extremely problematic.  According to Taylor, it 
offers a picture of agents who in perceiving the world take in “bits” of information 
from their surroundings, and then “process” them in some fashion, in order to 
emerge with the “picture” of the world they have, through a “calculus” of means 
and ends.7  Put in another way, it creates an understanding of human agency where 
people are motivated entirely by self-centeredness, with no immediate concern for 
or conceived dependency on their larger social and physical surroundings.  Taylor 
elaborates on three effects of disengaged rationality: 
The first is the picture of the (human) subject as ideally disengaged, that is, 
as free and rational to the extent that he has fully distinguished himself 
from the natural and social worlds, so that his identity is no longer to be 
defined in terms of what lies outside of him in these worlds.  The second, 
which flows from this, is a punctual view of the self, ideally ready as free 
and rational to treat these worlds—and even some of the features of his 
own character—instrumentally, as subject to change and reorganizing in 
order the better to secure the welfare of himself and others.  The third is the 
social consequence of the first two: an atomistic construal of society as 
constituted by, or ultimately to be explained in terms of, individual 
purposes.8    
 
For Taylor, the instrumentalism associated with this form of rational 
procedure fosters an outlook which is detrimental to human agency, particularly 
because it suppresses the realization that selfhood is a dialogical creation.  What 
this results in is a monological conception of human agency where people think 
and act as if they had been severed from their larger social and cultural world of 
involvements.  They have, for instance, become unaware of the specific 
“backgrounds” which influence their various “understandings” of the world, 
coming to believe that theirs is the only one.  Taylor elaborates:   
                                                 
7 Ibid., 63. 
8 Charles Taylor, “Overcoming Epistemology,” Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1995), 7. 
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To take an instrumental stance to nature is to cut us off from the sources of 
meaning in it. An instrumental stance to our own feelings divides us 
within, splits reason from sense.  And the atomistic focus on our individual 
goals dissolves community and divides us from each other.9 
 
Taylor is opposed to the modern notion of monological human agency for 
reasons which Herder would also support.  Since both believe that the genesis of 
the human mind and the development of a human being could not be something 
which each person could accomplish on his or her own but must involve a 
dialogical process negotiated partly overtly, partly internally, with others, the 
monological ideal, according to these opinions, is both unacceptable and 
untenable.  It constitutes a bar from ever attaining the force, depth, vibrancy and 
joy which comes from being connected with others.  For Herder and Taylor, what 
is needed is the discarding of the monological ideal for a more situated 
understanding of human agency, such as the one found in Herder’s theory of 
language.   
For the most part, there have been two common and related sorts of 
arguments aimed at discrediting the monological ideal.  The first consists in 
articulating a part of one’s background understanding, in such a form that one’s 
reliance on it through thoughts, perceptions, experiences, or languages becomes 
clear and undeniable.  The second approach then attempts to show that the 
articulated background is incompatible with crucial features of the instrumental 
approach, for instance, by pointing to the impossibility of an atomistic construal of 
human agency.  A human being, critics maintain, cannot and does not sort or gain 
her information in a singular and computational way, but is always subject to a 
wealth of sensations and social experiences which, whether she realizes it or not, 
shapes her understandings.   
While Taylor acknowledges that there have been many pioneers of this 
type of argument which others have followed in developing their own refutations, 
he draws attention to the fact that within Herder’s theory of language the basic 
elements of this argument can be found, making his philosophy of pluralism one of 
                                                 
9 Taylor, Sources of The Self, 500-501. 
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the first attempts to refute the instrumental picture and address its social 
ramifications.  Taylor claims that while “the move toward a more situated 
understanding of thinking is evident enough in the work of Wittgenstein and 
Heidegger … Herder is one of its pioneers.  He constantly stresses that we have to 
understand human reason and language as an integral part of our life form.”10    
In a manner very much akin to Herder’s own thought, Taylor suggests that 
the dialogical nature of the linguistic dimension is influential in creating a plurality 
of values.11  As he explains, “there are [a] variety of goals that we express in 
languages of qualitative contrast, which are of course very different from each 
other.”12  Some of these are universal, while others are obtained within a more 
limited collectivity such as the nation, while yet others are more particular and 
specific to cultures or groups. Consequently, within any person’s life there is 
always a multiplicity of goods to be recognized, acted upon and pursued.  These 
goods are not only plural in the numerical sense but also in an ontological sense; 
they are of qualitatively different types from one another and, because of this, 
cannot always be harmoniously combined, ranked, ordered or reduced to some 
more ultimate or foundational good.13  What is required to engage successfully in 
their ranking is a different approach towards thinking and reasoning about 
differences.     
For Taylor, pluralism has become an issue of increasing importance since 
its contact with instrumental rationality has caused several socially destructive 
transformations.  Besides the monological ideal, these transformations include the 
notion of foundationalism—understood by Taylor as the belief that universal 
moral principles can be established and applied to all people as a way of allowing 
people to co-exist—as well as various attitudes which result in identity 
misrecognition and cause social fragmentation.  To begin with, Taylor suggests 
that the tendency towards believing that universal moral positions can be 
                                                 
10 Taylor, “The Importance of Herder,” 91. 
11 For a concise account of the educational and theoretical influences which shaped Taylor’s ideas 
on language see Nicholas H. Smith, “Linguistic Philosophy and Phenomenology,” Charles Taylor: 
Meaning, Morals and Modernity (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2002), 18-35.  
12 Charles Taylor, “The Diversity of Goods,” Philosophical Papers II: Philosophy and the Human 
Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 244. 
13 Ruth Abby, Charles Taylor (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12. 
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established is heightened when instrumental rationality begins to take on canonical 
proportions, causing its usage to deceive people into believing that their moral 
principles are correct and should be applied to all peoples.  This, as both Herder 
and Berlin would agree (albeit with some minor differences),14 can create the early 
grounds for conflict.  Taylor elaborates:  
 
Berlin has tirelessly pointed out the irreconcilable conflict that we 
frequently face between different goods which we cannot help to 
subscribing to.  The modern vogue of ethical thinking, which tends to try to 
derive all our obligations from some single moral principle, has tended to 
hide and muffle these conflicts. His reminders have been salutary and 
important, but too little heeded.  I very much agree with him on this: 
human beings are always in a situation of conflict between moral demands, 
which seem to them to be irrecusable, but at the same time uncombinable.15  
 
An additional association involving instrumental rationality that has had a 
detrimental transformation has been its political application, what Taylor refers to 
as the procedural republic.  According to Taylor, proponents of the procedural 
republic (who may loosely even include the likes of Berlin)16 typically point to the 
fact that in face of the prospect of having to bring together so many differences of 
culture, origin, political experience, and identity, that it may be more beneficial to 
define a common understanding more in terms of “liberalism,” rather than self-
rule; that is more and more in terms of a procedural republic which focuses on 
individual rights and democratic and legal procedures, and less in terms of civic 
virtue.17  The benefits of this approach point to the fact that if you understand 
citizenship in terms of roles and rights you avoid endorsing the views of some at 
                                                 
14 While Herder seems to attribute foundationalism to self-centered tendencies, combined with 
sentiments such as ignorance, pride and an improper education, Berlin holds it to be a part of the 
intellectual tradition in the West which since Plato (or perhaps Pythagoras) has derived all of its 
moral understandings from foundational principles. 
15 Charles Taylor, “Charles Taylor Replies,” Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism:  The Philosophy of 
Charles Taylor in Question, ed. James Tully (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 213. 
16 Berlin may be considered an advocate of the procedural republic since he is a strong supporter of 
addressing differences almost exclusively through methods associated with negative liberty, such 
as individual rights and legal procedures.  Empowering people to greater understandings or social 
improvement through positive liberty and education, he believed, was a dangerous path. 
17 Charles Taylor, “A Tension in Modern Democracy,” Democracy and Vision: Sheldon Wolin and 
the Vicissitudes of the Political, ed. Botwinick Aryeg and William E. Connolly (New Jersey, 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 87. 
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the expense of others.  “Moreover,” Taylor explains, “you find an immediate 
common terrain on which all can gather.  Respect me, and accord me rights, just in 
virtue of my character, outlook, or the ends I espouse, not to speak, for example, of 
my gender, race, or sexual orientation.”18  Taylor elaborates:  
 
The act of abstraction here benefits from three important considerations.  
First, in an age of (at least menacing, if not actual) skepticism about moral 
views, it retreats from the terrain where the arguments seem the most 
dependent on our interpretations, the most contentious, and the most 
incapable of winning universal assent; whereas we can presumably all 
agree that, other things being equal, it is better to let people have what they 
want, or to respect their freedom to choose.  Second, this refusal to adopt a 
particular view of the good life leaves it to the individual to make the 
choice, and hence it fits with the anti-paternalism of the modern age.  It 
enshrines a kind of freedom.  Third, in face of the tremendous differences 
of outlook in modern society, utilitarianism and Kantian deontology seem 
to promise a way of deciding the issues we face in common without having 
to espouse the views of some against others.19   
 
The procedural republic also gives support to a form of liberalism espoused 
as the liberalism of neutrality.  One of the basic tenets of this liberalism is that a 
liberal society must be neutral on questions of what constitutes a good life.  Taylor 
explains: “[t]he good life is what each individual seeks, in his or her own way, and 
government would be lacking in impartiality, and thus in equal respect for all 
citizens, if it took sides on this question.”20  This, Taylor suggests, brings us to the 
most obvious point against the procedural republic: “that no one has yet devised a 
procedure that is seen as neutral by everyone.  The point about procedures, 
charters of rights, or redistributive principles is that they are not meant to enter 
into the knotty terrain of substantive differences in ways of life; but there is no 
way in practice of ensuring that this will be so.”21  
Thus, Taylor maintains, the approach used by procedural liberalism is not a 
very good way of living with difference, principally because it calls on people to 
abstract from differences, while simultaneously pushing the difference-blind 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 89. 
19 Ibid., 88. 
20 Charles Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2003), 17-18. 
21 Taylor, “A Tension in Modern Democracy,” 91. 
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approach to unwarranted lengths.  The effects of this approach involve some of the 
most central concerns of the 20th Century, including those of identity politics.  The 
idea that people should suppress their differences for the sake of fitting into a 
dominant mold (be it a particular notion of citizenship, or a certain understanding 
involving social and political “correctness”) has been the source of considerable 
controversy.  This has been brought to further light recently by the demands made 
by various groups such as feminists, cultural minorities, and homosexuals who 
have challenged such entrenched understandings, through the open disclosure of 
their differing beliefs and values.  What these groups have revealed is that the 
identity of a group and its recognition (or misrecognition) by others can be a 
source of great animosity and even conflict.   
Identity misrecognition is also a clear sign and early indicator for other 
types of exclusion.  If one cannot understand the grievances associated with the 
misrecognition of a group’s identity then it is also likely that group is not or will 
come to be an accepted or integrated part of society.  For Taylor, this is only 
compounded by the fact that a procedural republic’s focus on rights (such as the 
ones espoused within negative liberty) does not encourage people to learn about 
each other’s differences, but creates instead a culturally ill-informed approach to 
addressing diversity.  Such ignorance encourages interactions where a 
misrecognized identity can be projected back onto an individual or group creating 
a sense of worthlessness, while also depriving them of a sense of well-being and 
human dignity.  As this cycle of misunderstanding continues, so too does the 
process which reinforces the cleavages which add to social fragmentation. 
Since there are no simple ways to address these situations once they occur, 
one of the major objectives of democratic politics should be aimed at their 
prevention.  Thus, since misrecognition and fragmentation find their roots in a 
circular way through the failure of the democratic initiative itself (through, for 
instance, an exclusive focus on rights and negative liberty) one of the objectives of 
any multicultural society should be to address these failures.  To accomplish this 
Taylor, similarly to the approach advocated by Herder, favors an education 
process which involves positive liberty.  The primary elements of this approach 
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involve overcoming the effects of instrumental rationality; becoming aware of the 
dialogical conception of selfhood, as well as all of its implications; and, 
encouraging governments to act as facilitators (and not dictators) in the discussion 
of what should constitute the “good life.”  For Herder and Taylor, this 
commonality marks a significant departure in their approach towards pluralism 
from that of Berlin’s.     
Taylor’s approach towards positive liberty differs from Berlin’s in the 
sense that he draws attention to the fact that if negative liberty involves a choice 
among alternatives free from obstacles, then it must in certain circumstances share 
a common root with positive liberty.  He explains: “there seem to be cases in 
which the obstacles to freedom are internal and, if this is so, then freedom cannot 
simply be interpreted as the absence of external obstacles,” but must also include 
internal constraints which relate to the capacity of positive liberty to assist a 
person in attaining an improved state or understanding.22  For Herder and Taylor, 
positive liberty is indispensable in introducing into society attitudes and goals 
which are useful in addressing problems related to pluralism.23 
The focal point of positive liberty’s usage involves the replacement of the 
foundational style of reasoning derived from instrumental rationality with a form 
that acknowledges the pluralistic nature of moral goods.  Since understanding 
could not take place without the context of others and its advancement is largely 
tied to those encounters, as well as contemplation of the Other, recognizing the 
pluralistic nature of goods relates almost entirely to accepting the dialogical nature 
of knowledge.  Amongst its many related aspects, this requires that people learn 
how to reason about social values and problems in a way that does not try to 
disprove some radically opposed first premise, but rather shows how the policy (or 
issue of contestation) is “unconscionable on premises which both sides accept.”  
                                                 
22 Charles Taylor, “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty,” Law and Morality: Readings in Legal 
Philosophy, ed. David Dyzenhaus and Arthur Ripstein (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2001), 287. 
23 Berlin does not deny the existence of the common root of the two liberties but rather chooses not 
to focus on it, concentrating instead on how the justifications for positive liberty often leads to the 
relinquishing of the legal frameworks associated with negative liberty resulting in violence. 
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Taylor explains: “[y]ou can’t argue people into accepting an ultimate end, utility 
or any other, if they in fact reject it.”24   
What Taylor proposes to address this concern is a different method of 
approaching moral diversity, what he (taking up a theme from Gadamer) refers to 
as a fusion of horizons.25  The objective of a fusion of horizons involves a 
broadening of a human being’s own understanding in regards to the “background” 
which she and others use to derive their knowledge and judgments.  Taylor 
explains: “[w]hen we struggle to get beyond our limited home understanding, we 
struggle not towards a liberation from this understanding … but toward a wider 
understanding which can englobe the other undistortively.”26  The final aim is not 
to escape from a human being’s own horizon but to enter into a fusion with others: 
that is, fully comprehending others from the standpoint of her own background 
and coming to realize what is invariant, or universal, with all.  It is the continual 
challenge which involves altering and enlarging her own understanding, remaking 
its forms and limits, so the background which she uses to guide her interactions 
and give shape to her judgments is continually being enlarged. 
A fusion of horizons also involves a practical form of reasoning directed at 
the participants in conversation and at the things they posit or value.  Rather than 
using the approach used by instrumental rationality, practical reasoning proceeds 
through comparison, questioning, and the re-articulation of different views, to 
attempt to achieve some reconciliation of differences or to persuade the 
interlocutors that they should come to agree that one position is better.  Thus, 
practical reasoning is reasoning in transitions.  It is inherently a comparative 
                                                 
24 Charles Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1995), 36. 
25 Taylor’s choice in turning to Gadamer in order expand on Herder’s approach towards pluralism, 
specifically in developing methods of cognitive sensitivity and increased understandings to address 
social diversity, is interesting since, as Forster points outs, “there are some things in Herder which 
can suggest such a view.”  Nevertheless, while Herder’s position may appear to make him a sort of 
proto-Gadamer this was not his intended position; thus, possibly indicating why Taylor felt the 
need to turn to Gadamer over Herder to properly articulate this theme. See Michael Forster, 
“Introduction,” Herder: Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), xx; and Michael Forster, “Johann Gottfried von Herder,” 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  2001. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/herder/> (Retrieved 
11 November 2003), 8.     
26 Charles Taylor, “Comparison, History, Truth,” Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  Harvard University Press, 1995), 150-151. 
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enterprise and proceeds in stages by showing why one position is stronger than the 
alternatives in terms that all the parties can be induced to accept.27  At the same 
time, practical reasoning is also accompanied by the realization that even when a 
position is assented to that it should only be conceived as the “best account,” 
rather than any final or definitive truth.  Ruth Abbey explains: “[t]he outcome can 
only be the best account, because the possibility always remains that it may be 
superseded by a superior, more encompassing perspective.”28   
For Taylor, the Gadamerian perspective allows for the idea of an “omega 
point,” or a de facto universal, as it were, where all cultures and times would be 
able to exchange perspectives and come to share an undistortative horizon.29  But, 
since new perspectives are always emerging and cultures can always be left out of 
the decision-making process by mistake or choice, a fusion only points the way to 
an inclusiveness which overcomes ethnocentrism and works towards the 
establishment of universal truths.  According to Taylor, inclusiveness is the only 
possible course towards objectivity, since objectivity can only be achieved after 
everybody has been included in the discussion process.30  Inclusiveness and 
practical reasoning provide the atmosphere useful in deciding whether one ethical 
position or social perspective is better than another.    
While acknowledging that the historical development of cultures and 
civilizations has not, for the most part, been modeled on trying to achieve a social 
environment of inclusiveness, Taylor still suggests that some progress towards 
moral consensus has been made.  He explains: “[h]istory seems to exhibit some 
irreversible developments. … I’m talking about changes that seem irreversible 
because those who go through them can’t envisage reversing them, because they 
become standards for those who come after them.”31  For Taylor, any progress 
towards a moral consensus or social development is likely due, in part, to the 
                                                 
27 Abbey, 167. 
28 Ibid., 168. 
29 Taylor, “Comparison, History, Truth,” 151. 
30 Ibid., 151. 
31 Taylor does not clearly explain what these developments might be.  Instead, he offers several 
basic examples of what he believes to be historical advancements.  One example which he offers is 
that higher civilizations tend to put a greater focus on avoiding suffering.  Certainly we are much 
more sensitive on this score than our ancestors of a few centuries ago—as we can readily see if we 
consider the barbarous punishments they inflicted.  Taylor, Sources of The Self, 12.  
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compelling nature of the given innovations.  In many instances, the ontological 
similarities shared by all peoples allows for social agreements and improvements 
to be made even when an inclusive discussion has not taken place.  Nevertheless, 
Taylor still maintains that the best way to work towards the development of 
common positions and social improvements is through such a process.  For a 
clarification of what this might entail within a social environment, Taylor turns to 
the Herderian political model.  Taylor elaborates:   
 
The model which I myself adhere to, and would like to spell out has been 
invoked, among others, by Herder.  Its crucial idea is that people can also 
bond not in spite of, but because of, difference.  They can sense, that is, 
that the difference enriches each party, that their lives are narrower and less 
full alone than they are in association with each other.32   
 
What this pushes us towards is the idea which Herder and Taylor believe is 
the key to facing the dilemma of exclusion creatively: the idea of sharing identity 
space.  Taylor explains: “[p]olitical identities have to be worked out, negotiated, 
and creatively compromised between peoples who have to or want to live together 
under the same political roof (and this coexistence is always grounded in some 
mixture of necessity and choice).  Moreover, there solutions are never meant to 
last forever, but have to be discovered or invented anew by succeeding 
generations.”33  This requires that all people must come to the realization that any 
progress—whether it is a movement towards moral consensus or just increased 
understanding—is contingent on their knowledge and interactions with others.   
While this ideal has not yet been consciously applied in many political 
situations, Taylor does suggest that aspects of it can be found in current situations.  
What he points to are circumstances where the internal debate of groups has 
spilled over to influence the national agenda.  In recent decades several parties 
have had this function, but the most striking examples are found in some of the 
                                                 
32 Taylor, “A Tension in Modern Democracy,” 89. 
33 Charles Taylor, “Democratic Exclusion (and Its Remedies?),” Citizenship Diversity & 
Pluralism:  Canadian and Comparative Perspectives,  ed. C. Allan Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter 
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“new social movements”: for instance, the feminist (to the extent that one can 
speak of feminism as singular), and ecological campaigns.  These movements have 
not impacted the political process the ways interests usually do, who mobilize their 
efforts behind some agreed public stance and keep their internal discussion to 
themselves, but have allowed their internal debates to exist for all to see.  The 
success of this approach is evident in the fact that it is in part through this feature, 
as well as through the global impact of their message, that they have helped to 
reshape the public agenda.34 
While it is not clear how this would be implemented within a political 
context, Taylor does offer a few brief suggestions, such as making the boundary 
between the political system and the public sphere as porous as possible.  He also 
advises that while in any sphere dominated by large and powerful actors 
maintaining political neutrality may seem ideal, it may in fact be disastrous for 
genuine debate.  Since it is obviously easier for national networks, or prestigious 
newspapers with a national reputation, to take on the power-holders, these groups 
and similar groups, he seems to imply, should assume the responsibility of actively 
criticizing current power elites.35  What Taylor, therefore, seems to envision is not 
centralized collectivism but a kind of partnership between distinct institutions and 
associations whose interactions continually assist in determining what would come 
to constitute the good life. 
 The value of a shared conception of the good life is a notion which Taylor 
shares with Herder, but not Berlin.  For Herder and Taylor, having a conception 
that some goods are higher than others is an inescapable aspect of reality, 
influencing both individuals and communities to move towards their attainment as 
if they were teleological ideals.  While Berlin rejected this notion due to its 
connection with positive liberty, Herder and Taylor felt that within the proper 
circumstances it could be a useful in creating social cohesion.  Taylor envisions 
this process occurring in a “dialogical society” characterized by a pluralism of 
religious faiths, beliefs and moralities, and by a non-dogmatic attitude to the 
                                                 
34 Charles Taylor, “The Dangers of Soft Despotism,” The Essential Communitarian Reader,  ed. 
Amitai Etzioni  (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998) 48. 
35 Ibid., 49. 
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possession of truths.  The “reality of pluralism” would also enter into the varied 
beliefs of the citizens of the dialogical society.  A dialogical society would put 
dialogue in the central position which, in earlier societies, had been typically 
occupied by an established religion and in totalitarian societies by an official 
ideology.36   
For Herder and Taylor’s approach towards pluralism to work the 
presumption of equal worth must become an ingrained ideal.  People have to come 
to realize that there are other cultures and that they will have to live together more 
and more, both on a world scale and commingled in each individual society.37  
What this necessarily involves is the stance of equal dignity: a stance which is 
taken once people acknowledge the dialogical nature of knowledge and embark on 
the study of the other.38  The precise basis, from which this presumption can be 
grounded, however, remains unclear.  One ground which has been proposed, by 
Herder for instance, is a religious one.  Taylor explains it is the view of divine 
providence, “according to which all this variety of culture was not a mere accident 
but was meant to bring about a greater harmony” in society and history.39  For 
Herder, a transcendental theory of history was his way of grounding a moral 
system which tried to secure a person’s responsibility for others by encouraging 
them to learn about all that is other.   
While Taylor admits that he cannot rule out this view, he suggests that it is 
reasonable to suppose that such a system may have an ontological foundation.  If 
accepted, this would mark a significant difference in the foundation of his thought 
on pluralism as compared to Herder’s.40  What Taylor suggests is that merely on a 
human level one could argue that cultures that have provided the horizon of 
                                                 
36 Smith, 195. 
37 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), 72. 
38 Ibid., 72. 
39 Ibid., 72. 
40 Taylor’s precise position on this point is rather vague.  While he suggests that to be fully 
responsible to the other people (other-responsibility) through the apprehension of the Other as prior 
to the self is the highest form of self-realization, he does not specify what he believes the origin of 
this belief might be.   Within Sources of the Self, for instance, he offers several suggestions that it 
may be religious in origin but does not outrightly state that this is the case.  What he instead 
promises is to look into this question in greater detail within another work.    
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meaning for a large number of humans “are almost certain to have something that 
deserves our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that we 
have to abhor and reject.”  To put it another way, “it would take a supreme 
arrogance to discount this possibility a priori.”41  What we therefore may need is 
only a sense of our own limited part in the whole human story to accept the 
presumption of equal dignity.  This requires not “preemptory and inauthentic 
judgments of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative cultural 
study of the kind that must displace our horizons in the resulting fusions.”  Above 
all else, it must also entail the admission that we are far away from the ultimate 
horizon from which the relative worth of all cultures might be evident.42 
Taylor’s final approach towards pluralism is very similar to Herder’s.  For 
both, the incommensurability of goods is an inescapable aspect of the linguistic 
dimension.  While incommensurability does not necessarily entail conflict, the 
tendency to derive one’s reasoning from foundational moral principles does cause 
people, more frequently than not, to find themselves at odds.  This tendency is 
assisted by various factors (which in Taylor’s case are related to instrumental 
rationality) that cause people to become unaware of the dialogical nature of 
selfhood.  Overcoming these factors and establishing the dialogical model within 
conventional thought is the way to achieve the revolution in self-understanding 
needed to overcome diversity and establish common moral positions.      
While both Herder and Taylor believe that people could agree that some 
“ends” are preferable to others, Taylor presses this conviction further by claiming 
that some “ends” could perhaps, or have already, become universally accepted.  
Continual progress on this front could be achieved primarily through an 
enlargement or fusion of understandings, as well as establishing the political and 
institutional conditions which allowed for a communicative based response to 
emerging problems.  For this Taylor turns to the Herderian political model whose 
fundamental premise involves the partnership between distinct intuitions and 
associations free from any center of power.  For Herder and Taylor, a 
                                                 
41 Ibid., 72-73. 
42 Ibid., 73. 
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communicative process which continually strives to be socially inclusive is the 
best way of creating the sense of embeddedness needed to address pluralism and 
establish common moral positions. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The primary convention employed by Herder and Taylor in approaching 
social diversity and creating the conditions where co-existence can flourish 
involves the dialogical society.  Opposed to the monological ideal where human 
beings and the entire natural world are compartmentalized in such a way that they 
can be manipulated in order serve a person’s own interests, the dialogical society 
views all of existence as an inseparable whole whose parts demand 
acknowledgement and respect.  Achieving these attitudes is assisted through 
Herder’s concept of Einfühlung where a human being tries to project herself into 
the context of another person’s socio-historic background.  This “projection” 
assists people in better understanding and appreciating the distinctiveness of 
others.  Entering into communicative exchanges with an openness to others and 
willingness to use Einfühlung is indispensable to all interactions within a 
dialogical society.   
For Herder and Taylor, a dialogical society is dependent on acknowledging 
the teleological disposition of human nature.  The vast array of social differences 
present throughout history and various social situations exist as a resource to 
improve human understanding and advance humanity.  Herder explains, “[n]o 
individual human being exists for himself; ‘he is inserted into the whole of the 
species, he is only one for the continuing series.’”1  Human nature, accordingly, is 
always something more than one person or Volk can encompass.  It is the process 
by which a human being continually enters into social exchanges which increase 
her understanding and add to an ongoing historical process which improves 
humanity.  She, as with all human beings, is an important and vital link in an 
ongoing historical chain.  What she learns and passes on to others, no matter how 
trivial, helps future generations.  Herder elaborates: 
                                                 
1 Herder, “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” 141. 
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Each individual is a human being; consequently, he continues to think for 
the whole chain of his life.  Each individual is a son or daughter, was 
educated through instruction; consequently, he always inherited a share of 
the thought-treasures of his ancestors early on, and will pass them down in 
his own way to others.  Hence in a certain way there is ‘no thought, no 
invention, no perfection which does not reach further, almost ad infinitum.’  
Just as I can perform no action, think no thought, that does not have a 
natural effect on the whole immeasurable sphere of my existence, likewise 
neither I nor any creature of my kind can do so without also having an 
effect with each (action or thought) for the kind and for the continuing 
totality of the whole kind and for the continuing totality of the whole kind.  
Each (action or thought) always produces a large or small scale wave: each 
changes the conditions; always has an effect on others, changes something 
in these as well—the first thought in the first human soul is connected with 
the last thought in the last human soul.2 
 
Since communication and social exchanges are the processes which 
advance humanity throughout history Herder and Taylor both suggest that a 
political community should be structured in such a manner that discussion and 
deliberation can flourish.  While the degree to which these conditions can be 
actualized will differ from community to community, the starting point in all 
instances involves accepting the dialogical nature of knowledge.  Accepting the 
dialogical nature of knowledge challenges the monological ideal and changes the 
trajectory from which human interactions typically take place.  It promotes a 
process where people begin to seek out new experiences and conversations with an 
openness to others and eagerness to expand their understandings.  The unrestricted 
flow of information, free from censorship or the desire to exchange information 
for a profit, is an additional element associated with the dialogical nature of 
knowledge.  A final element involves the cultivation of all things associated with 
communication and expression (such as literature, art, and poetry) which can 
improve human understanding. 
Another aspect integral to a dialogical society is an education process 
which involves historical and cultural studies.  These studies include a forward and 
backwards looking dimension.  Looking backwards into history and understanding 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 155. 
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(using Einfühlung) the difficulties, similarities, and reactions of different peoples, 
in a variety of socio-historic contexts, allows those engaged in the discussion 
process at hand to make more informed decisions.  It allows for a better 
understanding of others which is vital in the ongoing fusion of horizons since 
those engaged in the public debate can draw on a larger wealth of information to 
formulate their “best accounts.”  
Qualities common to all human beings can be found in their associative 
linkage through language.  All human beings are connected by language and its 
related qualities.  These basic qualities include the need to give expression to 
feelings and concerns, the need to communicate these with others, 
acknowledgement that knowledge is not only dialogical but also dependent on a 
socio-historic context, and a desire to move beyond (or expand on) the 
understanding encapsulated within this socio-historic context by interacting with 
others.  These qualities shared by all human beings also reveal the principal 
characteristic of human existence: that the flourishing of the human species 
depends on its communication and co-existence with others.  Herder explains: 
“[t]he distinctive characteristic plan which governs a human race has been pointed 
out: that through the chain of instruction parents and children become one, and 
hence each link only gets shoved by nature between two others in order to receive 
and to communicate.”3         
It may seem that the emphasis on a more situated understanding of human 
agency, with its belief in the linguistic origin of identity and teleological 
explanation of human nature, could lead to a set of policy innovations with a 
socially inclusive hue.  In actual fact, however, the move towards successful co-
existence is hampered, most notably, by those who refuse to accept the perspective 
brought forth by Herder’s linguistic insights, as well as the complications and lack 
of clarity which is involved with implementing these insights as a political model.  
Amongst those involved in the former category are various people who find 
themselves aligned more closely with Berlin’s rights-based approach than the 
dialogical position which is exemplified by Herder and added to by Taylor.   
                                                 
3 Ibid., 155. 
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A fundamental problem with the rights-based approach is that it often finds 
itself in opposition to the empowerment of groups which is required by the 
Herderian model.  Simply stated, advocates of the rights-based approach typically 
maintain that rights should be applied equally and universally to all peoples.  A 
major complication with this approach is that it runs counter to the Herderian 
model’s recommendation that, in certain circumstances, it may be necessary to 
empower groups, perhaps even granting them additional rights, to ensure that they 
can equally participate within the political process.  For those who adhere 
exclusively to a rights-based approach, this aspect of Herder’s group pluralism is 
an unacceptable violation of their notion of equality.  Convincing advocates of the 
rights-based approach to accept group pluralism is a clear challenge to the 
implementation of the Herderian perspective.  
Nevertheless, the linguistic dualism and multicultural nature of Canada has 
motivated many recent Canadian political philosophers, especially Will Kymlicka, 
to argue that the recognition of group rights, far from violating the principle of 
human rights, is essential to their fulfillment.  Since a good human life is one lived 
within the context of a cultural community which one has inherited, measures 
designed to promote the continued existence of such communities are essential to 
maintaining or improving the quality of a person’s life.  However, these 
philosophers also believe that group rights must not be permitted to “trump” 
fundamental human rights.4 
Related to the tension between individual rights and group pluralism are 
several difficulties associated with implementation of the Herderian model.  For 
one thing, full implementation involves achieving the utmost degree of democratic 
inclusiveness. According to Herder and Taylor, this involves self-rule in all 
political areas.  Society should be a collection of self-governing citizens and 
                                                 
4 Kymlicka has argued for this position in numerous works, but the clearest expression of it can be 
found in his Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).  Charles Taylor 
has long been an advocate of group rights.  A useful statement of his position and critical responses 
to it can be found in Multiculturalism, edited and introduced by Amy Gutman (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994).  Indeed, the concern with multiculturalism and group rights is coming to 
be identified as forming the basis of a distinctly Canadian political philosophy.  See, for example, 
“Introduction,” in Ronald Beiner and Wayne Norman, eds., Canadian Political Philosophy (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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identity groups who actively and more directly participate in all areas of the 
political process.  What is required to achieve this ideal is that a considerable 
amount of political power must come to be decentralized.   
In the Canadian context, decentralization would likely involve regional and 
neighborhood alignments, as well as ethnic and linguistic groups becoming 
empowered members (to a larger extent than they currently are) of the political 
process.  As a result, one of the key problems to be addressed involves how to 
attain the right balance between the “centrifugal” forces needed to direct political 
power outwards, towards the plurality of identity groups, and the “centripetal” 
forces required for efficient state governing in a country as large and diverse as 
Canada.  Aside from the difficulties associated with attaining the right balance of 
powers, additional complications, such as ensuring that the empowerment process 
is fair, inclusive and, most importantly, socially understood and accepted, would 
certainly be an ongoing challenge.  
This problem is further compounded by problems relating to the 
redistribution of societal powers.  Particularly speaking, in the Canadian 
circumstance this involves the further and continual displacement of several power 
holders within society, such as results from the influence which Eastern Canada 
has on the political process in Western Canada, the similar relationship which 
Anglophone Canada has over Francophone Canada and the First Nations Peoples 
and the Federal government’s control of policy areas which might best be dealt 
with by the Provincial governments.  Additional complications also include the 
management of the economy and its stakeholders by the collectively negotiated 
needs of the citizens.5  Needless to say, in all of these instances relinquishing one 
sphere of power or influence in order to empower another is a delicate and 
                                                 
5 For Herder and Taylor, an economy which operates closely to the free enterprise model, that is, a 
politically unregulated system of economic production which is shaped largely by market forces, is 
unacceptable.  The autonomy which the free enterprise model grants to economic interactions, 
making all economic pursuits free from political interference, whether that is from the state or 
another form of citizen representation, is in direct conflict with their communicative and inclusive 
model of democracy.  For a brief account of Herder’s and Taylor’s views on economics see Johann 
Gottfried Herder, “This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity,” Herder: 
Philosophical Writings, ed., trans. Michael N. Forster (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 328; and Nicholas H. Smith, Charles Taylor: Meaning, Morals and Modernity (Malden, 
MA: Polity Press, 2002), 183-192.    
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complicated process.  This is especially the case when the parties in question are 
not familiar with or cannot properly understand each other.    
A further complication involving the implementation of a dialogical 
society relates to its confrontation with the power holders and social attitudes that 
can affect the functioning of the communication process.  For example, power 
holders can use their resources to influence the agenda and topics of discussion 
debated by the speech community.  Also related to this concern is the seduction of 
the speech community by ideological doctrines which can be detrimental to 
genuine social debate.  Naturally, within a dialogical society preventing such 
situations is an ongoing challenge.  
Despite the complication involved in establishing a dialogical society it is 
clear that a political process which uses dialogical ideals, asserting the primacy of 
communication and discussion, is advantageous.  Evidence of this fact can be seen 
within the Canadian context whose vast array of differences, at times, has seemed 
on the verge of tearing the country apart.  In the face of constitutional wranglings 
which have frequented Canada’s political past, as well as the bilingual and 
regional related disputes which are a continual problem, Canadians have 
continually established common positions and found reasons why they should 
continue to co-exist.  Furthermore, this process is almost always done in a civil 
and peaceful way.  The Canadian experience exemplifies an essential theme in the 
perspective shared by Herder and Taylor; namely, that improving the 
communicative process is the most effective way of creating conditions where 
human beings can continue to co-exist. 
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